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TEXT AND PRETEXT:  THE FUTURE OF 
MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION AFTER 
ASHCROFT V. AL-KIDD 
CATHERINE CONE∗ 
The Supreme Court, in its 2011 decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, closed the door 
under the Fourth Amendment on a material witness’s ability to argue that the 
government pretextually held the witness for individual investigation rather than for 
testimony in an upcoming criminal proceeding.  Although traditionally pretext was 
raised as a Fourth Amendment argument, a material witness can also claim pretext 
under the federal material witness statute by arguing that detaining officers did not 
comply with the statute, and thus, avoid the constitutional argument altogether.  In 
al-Kidd, the Court did not address whether a material witness can instead argue 
pretext through the federal material witness statute directly. 
Regardless of whether the country is in the immediate aftermath of an attack on its 
national security, like the 9/11 attacks, or in peacetime, the concerns that arose in 
relation to witnesses who were pretextually held following 9/11 are equally applicable.  
These concerns relate to the justification of a witness’s incarceration and include the 
government’s misrepresentation of how “material” a witness actually is to a criminal 
proceeding and the genuine flight risk a material witness poses. 
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To protect against the reality of these concerns, courts should read a higher 
standard into the federal material witness statute before authorizing a warrant to 
detain a material witness.  Today, in order to detain a material witness pursuant to 
the statute, the government must meet the plain terms of the materiality and 
impracticability requirements; however, courts have not definitively determined the 
evidentiary standard used to assess whether those terms have been met.  Therefore, the 
door is still open for discussion concerning the evidentiary burden the government 
should be required to meet to legally detain a material witness under the statute. 
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“There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder 
of it.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that following a recent executive order authorizing the 
use of limited force in Syria, Reuters and the Associated Press 
confirm that an Iranian terrorist cell is lending support to Bashar al-
Assad and planning an attack on U.S. soil.  Within days of the alleged 
order, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detains an Iranian 
man, a community college student who left Iran some years ago and 
currently resides in San Diego, California.  FBI agents claim that the 
student must be detained as a material witness for the upcoming trial 
of a suspected Iranian terrorist.  The government supports the 
detention by pointing to a piece of paper found in the terrorist’s car, 
which bears both the terrorist’s name and the student’s old phone 
number.  The government also indicates that the student’s 
continuing ties to Iran and his unwillingness to come forward and 
share information regarding the terrorist further suggest that he is a 
flight risk.  The student is arrested, and weeks later, he has yet to be 
called as a witness.  Although hypothetical, this story closely 
                                                 
 1. Letter from John Dalberg-Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (April 5, 
1887), in HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND STUDIES 503, 504 (John Neville Figgis & Reginald 
Vere Laurence eds., 1907). 
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resembles the case of Osama Awadallah, a student who was held as a 
material witness in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.2 
The federal material witness statute authorizes a judge to order the 
arrest of an individual whose testimony “is material in a criminal 
proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to 
secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” 3  Material witnesses 
enjoy the same constitutional right to pretrial release as other federal 
detainees, and federal law requires a material witness’s release if his4 
testimony “can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further 
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.”5  Typically, 
a material witness challenging his detention will claim that the arrest 
amounted to an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
because the purpose of the arrest was not to use the witness for 
testimony in another case, but was instead to hold him as a suspected 
criminal.6  Thus, the detainee’s argument looks to the subjective 
intent of the arresting officer in claiming that the detention was 
pretextual.7  While the Fourth Amendment is most commonly 
invoked by material witness detainees arguing pretext, it is no longer 
an effective legal argument that detainees have at their disposal.8  A 
                                                 
 2. See United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah II), 349 F.3d 42, 45–49 (2d Cir. 
2003) (explaining that Osama Awadallah was arrested after the 9/11 attacks when 
federal agents searched a car that belonged to one of the hijackers of the plane that 
crashed into the Pentagon and found a piece of paper that read, “Osama 589-5316,” 
which was used to track down a San Diego address where Awadallah lived).  On this 
evidence, the court considered Awadallah to be a flight risk and issued a warrant for 
his detention.  Id. at 47. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
 4. To be as factually accurate as possible, this Comment refers to a material 
witness’s rights through “he/his/him” terminology because the majority of the cases 
referenced involve male material witnesses’ experiences.  However, this Comment 
intends to show prospectively that any proposed application of the federal material 
witness statute equally applies to male and female witnesses. 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 
 6. See James E. Mosimann, Note, Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft:  Clearly Established 
Confusion, 96 IOWA L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2010) (observing that Fourth Amendment 
subjective intent arguments claiming pretextual detention fail where the government 
is able to provide an objective reason for the action under Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 (1996)); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE:  HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 17–25 
(2005) [hereinafter HRW REPORT] (describing the U.S. government’s continued 
practice of holding individuals suspected of terrorism through the material witness 
statute when the government lacked probable cause to hold witnesses on individual 
charges). 
 7. See HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 18–19 (referencing Michael Chertoff’s 
admission that he, along with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and other 
architects of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategy routinely held material 
witnesses for criminal investigation rather than for use as a witness in an unrelated 
criminal proceeding). 
 8. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (reasoning that “not a 
single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable 
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material witness can also claim that detention is illegally pretextual 
under the material witness statute by arguing that the detaining 
officers did not comply with the terms of the statute in seeking the 
detention.  Claiming pretext under the material witness statute avoids 
the constitutional argument altogether.9 
Even though material witnesses are no longer being detained in as 
great a number as they were immediately following the 9/11 attacks, 
pretextual use of the material witness statute is still relevant today 
because similar security issues that might motivate the government to 
detain individuals as material witnesses could arise in the future.  
Under those circumstances, it is plausible that the government could 
once again seek to detain material witnesses to bypass the more 
rigorous standards required to charge an individual with a specific 
crime.10  Moreover, the issues relevant to the detention of material 
witnesses who were pretextually held immediately following 9/11 
equally apply to material witnesses who are pretextually held today.  
These issues include the government’s misrepresentation of how 
“material” a witness is to a criminal proceeding, the actual flight risk 
that a material witness poses, the witness’s liberty interest, and the 
court’s interest in conserving judicial resources. 
This Comment argues that courts should condition the validity of 
warrants on clear and convincing evidence under the material 
witness statute because doing so would protect the witness’s 
significant liberty interest and help screen for instances of improper 
motive.  In addition to utilizing the clear and convincing standard, 
conducting periodic status hearings would help to further minimize 
the pretextual use of the material witness statute because these 
measures combined would allow courts to regularly and thoroughly 
scrutinize the government’s proffered reasons for continued 
detention.  This Comment explains why the federal material witness 
statute is the appropriate avenue to challenge pretextual detention 
of material witnesses. 
                                                 
arrest pursuant to a material witness warrant unconstitutional”); infra Part I.A.4 
(noting that arguments about pretext have largely been foreclosed because courts 
employ an objective standard in this analysis). 
 9. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(implying that the Court did not explore whether the material witness statute itself 
was used as a pretext to detain al-Kidd as a suspected terrorist because the Court 
presumed al-Kidd was held under a validly obtained material witness warrant). 
 10. See infra Part I.B (illustrating how the events of 9/11, which resulted in an 
uptick in material witness arrests for individuals, who at times never testified but 
were later charged with a crime, could set a precedent for future breaches of 
national security). 
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Part I provides an overview of the material witness statute, 
including a discussion of the statute’s interpretive case law and the 
post-9/11 change in application of material witness detention that led 
to Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.11  Part I concludes by drawing analogies from the 
civil detention and equal protection contexts where courts apply 
higher evidentiary and judicial review standards because of the 
significant individual interests at stake.  These analogies create three 
illustrations:  (1) the clear and convincing standard affords greater 
protections to the civilly detained during initial determination and 
periodic review hearings; (2) heightened levels of judicial review 
monitors against pretext in equal protection cases; and (3) 
continuing challenges to the government demanding more 
accountability for illegal civil detentions or unequal and dissimilar 
treatment can yield parallel safeguards in the material witness 
context. 
Part II builds on these borrowed standards to show that a court 
determining whether to detain a material witness can similarly 
require a higher standard of proof from the government in any 
application for a material witness warrant or petition for continued 
detention.  Specifically, courts should grant the government’s 
application for a material witness warrant only where the government 
has provided clear and convincing evidence—the standard used in 
civil detention cases—in order to protect the witness’s liberty 
interest.  Part II then discusses how using a heightened standard of 
review to assess the validity of material witness warrants helps detect 
improper motive by more readily smoking out pretext and protects 
against unnecessary and harmful deference to government interests 
at the expense of both the witness and the court.  Additional judicial 
oversight of material witness detention can also ensure that the 
government is using the least restrictive means to detain material 
witnesses and is not falsely misrepresenting the reasons why it is 
appropriate to continue holding the witness.  Finally, Part II 
recommends that courts move away from the era of great deference 
to government interests, which this Comment suggests can be 
accomplished through greater checks on prosecutorial and 
governmental abuse and through new governmental standards of 
sufficiency as to materiality and impracticability. 
                                                 
 11. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Material Witness Statute:  Origins, Purpose, and Practice 
The government’s authority to arrest and detain material witnesses 
was the long-standing tradition under English Law, dating back to the 
founding of the United States.12  The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided 
that a witness whose testimony was found to be necessary by the court 
could be detained and imprisoned.13  The power to actually detain a 
witness developed as a necessary consequence of the establishment of 
a compulsory process for the appearance of material witnesses.14  
Today, the federal material witness statute gives courts the power to 
exercise discretion in determining whether to incarcerate witnesses 
who refuse to testify, even when the arrest is not preceded by a 
subpoena.15 
The “duty to disclose knowledge of a crime” is so essential that 
Congress developed a practice of allowing for detention of material 
witnesses even when the knowing party is innocent.16  As one court 
has described, 
[a] material witness is subject to detention not because he is 
suspected of a crime, but because he has knowledge of a crime, and 
because there is adequate doubt whether he will attend the 
trial . . . .  The goal is the presentation at trial of the material 
knowledge possessed by the witness.17 
                                                 
 12. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Francisco 
M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 802 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938–39); see 
also Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a Post-9/11 World:  Mission Creep 
or Fresh Start?, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (discussing that under the common 
law of England, the King’s subjects owed service of knowledge and discovery, which 
encompassed a duty to testify to material information). 
 13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (stating that “the 
recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case; which 
recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be, may require on 
pain of imprisonment”); see also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention 
in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85, 136 (2011) (quoting the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and describing the obligation to testify before a court). 
 14. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (explaining that the duty to 
provide testimony necessitated a correlating authority to detain to ensure a witness’s 
testimony where he might not otherwise appear and testify); see also Barry v. United 
States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 617 (1929); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 
273, 279–80 (1919) (elaborating that as early as 1612, the King of England declared 
that his subjects were required to provide the sovereign with information when it was 
requested). 
 15. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 69 (2002) (indicating that a court may detain and 
imprison a material witness if there is a reasonable belief that the witness will not 
appear at the suspect’s trial). 
 16. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 
U.S. 156, 184 (1953)). 
 17. Id. at 805 (emphasis added). 
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Congress developed the federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3144, to effectuate the use of a material witness’s testimony at trial. 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 
The federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, provides that 
a court may order the detention of a material witness only upon 
certain showings by the government that (1) “the testimony of [the] 
person is material in a criminal proceeding;” and (2) it is 
“impracticable to secure” the witness’s presence by subpoena.18  A 
court assessing materiality asks whether the facts underlying the 
material arrest warrant, which are set forth in the government’s 
affidavit, establish probable cause to believe that the detainee had 
information that is material to a trial or grand jury proceeding.19  
When a court cannot determine whether a witness’s testimony would 
be material, rather than merely cumulative of other witnesses’ 
testimony or impeachment evidence, the government fails to 
demonstrate materiality.20  As to impracticability, a detaining officer 
must demonstrate to the court that the circumstances surrounding 
detention of the material witness made it truly impracticable to 
secure the witness by subpoena.21  The court’s impracticability 
determination is based on whether the witness poses a high risk of 
flight.22  The impracticability showing in an application for a material 
witness warrant under the federal material witness statute must be 
based on probable cause, as is required for materiality.23 
The federal material witness statute also requires that government 
officials secure a material witness’s participation in future criminal 
proceedings through the least restrictive means possible, whether 
that be by issuing a subpoena or by deposing the witness ahead of the 
                                                 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 19. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70 (noting that courts adopt a totality of the 
circumstances approach when assessing materiality). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d 303, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining that the testimony of two unidentified witnesses in an organized crime 
case was not sufficient for the judge to issue a warrant securing their presence at trial 
because there was not enough known about the witnesses and simply no showing that 
their testimony would be material to the case). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see also Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 335–36 (finding that the 
government did not meet its burden of demonstrating impracticability because 
without the identity of the witnesses, the court could only speculate as to whether it 
would be practicable to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial through a subpoena). 
 22. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 618 (1929) 
(“[W]here suspicions exist that a witness may disappear, or be spirited away, before 
trial, in criminal cases, . . . he may be held . . . to appear at the trial . . . .”). 
 23. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 64; Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942–43 
(9th Cir. 1971). 
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criminal proceedings.24  The federal material witness statute 
recommends that the government use the least restrictive means 
possible because the government should only deprive a material 
witness of a liberty interest through arrest and detention as a last 
resort.25  Nonetheless, based on the power conferred by the federal 
material witness statute, a court can employ its judgment in deciding 
whether to issue an arrest warrant without first requiring a 
subpoena.26  Additionally, the statute applies to material witnesses 
whose testimony will be used at any criminal proceeding, and thus 
encompasses both grand jury indictments and criminal trials.27 
2. Challenging detention through 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
Once a material witness has been detained pursuant to a material 
witness warrant, the witness is to be treated under a second statute 
that addresses the release or detention of defendants pending trial, 
18 U.S.C. § 3142.28  Section 3142 sets forth the witness’s right to a 
hearing following detention: 
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any 
condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure 
the appearance of such person as required . . . upon motion of the 
attorney for the Government or upon the judicial officer’s own 
motion in a case, that involves . . . a serious risk that such person 
will flee . . . .29 
                                                 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 
 25. See id. (exemplifying how material witness detention can only be prolonged if 
the witness cannot be deposed and only to “prevent a failure of justice” in 
recognition of the material witness’s liberty interest); Heidee Stoller et al., 
Developments in Law and Policy:  The Costs of Post-9/11 National Security Strategy, 22 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 202 (2004). 
 26. United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Bacon, 449 
F.2d at 939). 
 27. See In re Application of the U.S. for a Material Witness Warrant, Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3144, for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
[hereinafter Material Witness Warrant for John Doe] (clarifying that the Bacon court 
interpreted the statute to include grand jury witnesses and explaining that the Bacon 
court’s language was in turn incorporated in the revised and current statute); see also 
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 55 (holding that “[w]hen Congress enacted § 3144 . . . 
there was a settled view that a grand jury proceeding is a ‘criminal proceeding’ for 
purposes of the material witness statute” and thus applying the statute to both trial 
and grand jury witnesses); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 230–31 (7th Cir. 
1982) (confirming that Oliver was properly detained under the statute because a 
responsible government official provided that Oliver’s testimony was material to a 
grand jury proceeding). 
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (establishing that material witnesses are to be treated in 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142). 
 29. See id. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (indicating that a detained witness’s hearing must 
be held immediately upon the witness’s initial appearance before an officer of 
the court). 
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The hearing serves as a valuable procedural safeguard for witnesses 
because the government is required to inform the detainee of the 
reasons for the detention, and the detainee is allowed the 
opportunity to challenge the detention.30 
Underscoring the importance of a material witness’s post-detention 
hearing, the court noted in United States v. Feingold31 that the witness is 
entitled to present additional information to a judicial officer to 
arrange the conditions of his release.32  At this hearing, the “full 
factual picture can be developed, thereby protecting [the witness] 
against any possible abuse of the arrest power by the Government.”33  
Similarly, in Adams v. Hanson,34 the court was deeply troubled that the 
witness was not provided such a hearing and thus had no opportunity 
to be heard.35  The court found that the lack of a hearing violated the 
witness’s rights, particularly because the judicial process is intended 
to provide a check on prosecutorial abuse.36  Courts weigh a host of 
interests at these hearings:  (1) the materiality of the testimony, 
including whether the witness’s testimony is cumulative; (2) the 
length of proposed detention—the longer the detention, the greater 
the showing required by the state to justify it; (3) the harm to the 
witness and the witness’s family, including lost wages and missed 
                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. 416 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 32. Id. at 629.  The court gleaned this right from the former federal witness 
legislation, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984).  Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 
629. 
 33. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 629; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (providing the 
witness with the opportunity to exercise his right “to testify, to present witnesses, to 
cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by 
proffer or otherwise” through a full evidentiary hearing, unlike ex parte hearings 
where material witness warrants are granted); Cochran, supra note 12, at 6 (observing 
that § 3142 affords detainees a number of “procedural safeguards,” including the 
right to proffer testimony and evidence and to present and cross-examine witnesses).  
Many states have instituted similar practices.  See, e.g., Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 
397, 406 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that despite the demand of the Michigan material 
witness statute, the defendant did not have the opportunity to be heard at the post-
detention hearing because the court failed to “provide a witness the opportunity to 
be heard and to assess itself the materiality of her testimony and the likelihood that . 
. . [the witness] would fail to appear”); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 806–
07 (Ct. App. 2001) (specifying that when a court considers whether to order a 
witness to appear or face judicial consequences, the court should take into account a 
non-exhaustive list of factors, such as “[t]he nature of the charges in the underlying 
criminal prosecution” and “[t]he length of the proposed detention”). 
 34. 656 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 406. 
 36. Id. at 406, 410; see also In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805–06 (noting 
that the initial hearing entitles the witness to notice of the basis on which detention 
is sought and the right to dispute the allegations providing for his detention). 
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classes; (4) the witness’s financial resources, particularly in setting 
bail; and (5) other alternatives to incarceration.37 
Another valuable safeguard for any material witness is the habeas 
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, because as detained individuals, 
material witnesses fall under the statute’s ambit.38  This statute offers a 
material witness the opportunity to have a court determine whether 
the witness can continue to be held because the statute applies to 
categories of individuals, including those who are needed in court to 
testify.39  For example, José Padilla, a post-9/11 detainee arrested on 
suspicion of plotting a dirty bomb, questioned his continued 
detention pursuant to a material witness warrant by filing a habeas 
corpus petition; Padilla’s petition prompted the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit to hold that the President lacked the 
authority to indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen, who was arrested in the 
United States, as a material witness.40 
3. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 15 and 46 
Similar to the habeas corpus statute, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure—regarding depositions—establishes an 
additional safeguard for potential material witnesses by providing 
that an individual may be detained only if the individual cannot be 
deposed, and additionally sets forth the parameters for deposing 
detainees.41  However, depositions are not taken as a matter of right; 
instead, depositions are only granted in exceptional situations.42  
                                                 
 37. In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806–07. 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
 39. Id. § 2241(c)(5). 
 40. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the President 
does not have the authority to detain a material witness seized outside of a combat 
zone), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL 
OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR 100–01 (2008) (detailing that the 
Second Circuit held that the President did not have the authority to indefinitely detain 
José Padilla as an enemy combatant, but that the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
based on a technicality).  For an overview of José Padilla’s detention, see Jose Padilla, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
people/p/jose_padilla/index.html. 
 41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; see also United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009, 
1989 WL 39685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (finding that securing the witness’s 
testimony would be impracticable under the material witness statute because he was a 
Uruguayan citizen scheduled to leave the United States well in advance of the 
defendant’s trial, but nonetheless granting the witness’s request that his testimony be 
taken by deposition because his case was exceptional and presented due process and 
humanitarian considerations). 
 42. See United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating 
that depositions are meant to safeguard testimony, not “provide a method of pretrial 
discovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 
153, 159 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the 1975 amendment to Rule 15(a) 
provides a stricter standard for depositions in criminal cases than for depositions in 
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Furthermore, it is the party requesting the deposition, rather than 
the government, that must prove that “exceptional circumstances” 
require that the testimony be taken through a deposition.43 
Depositions are intended to facilitate the underlying goal of the 
material witness statute—detaining material witnesses using the least 
restrictive means possible.  For this reason, reading the federal 
material witness statute in conjunction with Rule 15 provides that the 
witness must be released unless the deposition would not serve as an 
adequate substitute for live testimony, such that the deposition would 
result in a “failure of justice.”44  For example, if a defendant was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses or 
compel witnesses in his favor, then allowing that material witness to 
testify via deposition rather than appearing in court would violate his 
constitutional rights and equate to a failure of justice that allows for 
continued detention of a material witness.45 
Additionally, material witnesses can avail themselves of Rule 46 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the 
government to issue bi-weekly reports to the court stating its reasons 
for holding any material witness for more than ten days pending 
indictment, arraignment, or trial.46  The rule affords each witness the 
ability to have a court exercise continuing supervision over his 
detention for the purpose of “eliminating all unnecessary 
detention”47 through periodic hearings.48  At the hearing, the 
government must provide the court with a report on each material 
witness held in its custody for more than ten days whose testimony 
                                                 
civil cases, whereby depositions for criminal cases can be taken only under 
exceptional circumstances, subject to the trial court’s discretion). 
 43. Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1124. 
 44. See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
deposition testimony is not a first measure but a last resort, allowable only after the 
government exhausted reasonable efforts to assure the witness’s presence at trial). 
 45. United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also id. at 
949 (stating that courts reading Rule 15 in conjunction with the material witness 
statute should deny a request for testimony by deposition only where a failure of 
justice would ensue); id. at 951 (proposing that whether material witnesses are called 
for the defense as opposed to the government weighs heavily in determining whether 
it is appropriate for material witness testimony to be taken by deposition). 
 46. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2) (implementing additional checks on the 
government’s prolonged detention of material witnesses). 
 47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1). 
 48. See Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(g) (amended 2002) (current version at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 46(h)(1))). 
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is still pending and must give reasons why the witness should not 
be released.49 
4. The Fourth Amendment 
A material witness may challenge pretextual detention on 
constitutional grounds under the Fourth Amendment.50  However, 
the Supreme Court has foreclosed any argument that might be made 
regarding pretextual seizures under the Fourth Amendment because 
the inquiry governing the validity of a search or seizure is objective, 
not subjective.51  Despite the objective nature of the inquiry, the 
constitutional question is still raised with regards to whether an 
individual is detained without reasonable, objective grounds.52  
Because the material witness’s ability to argue against his detention 
on constitutional grounds is largely foreclosed,53 this Comment 
instead encourages questioning the validity of the underlying 
material witness warrant and any accompanying pretext under the 
federal material witness statute. 
B. Shifting Calculus:  Post-9/11 Material Witness Detention and Its 
Application in Federal Courts 
While, in theory, meeting the statutory requirements for material 
witness detention is intended to apply uniformly, in practice, events 
affecting the nation’s security altered the application of the federal 
material witness statute.54  Following 9/11, the number of detainees 
                                                 
 49. See id. (expressing that the government is required to report on the status of 
each witness even if the government wishes to take the witness’s testimony by 
deposition). 
 50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing for the “right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”). 
 51. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (establishing that the 
relevant question is whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the 
challenged] action”); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) 
(explaining that reasonableness inquiries are “predominantly . . . objective 
inquir[ies]” rather than subjective ones); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 
(1996) (clarifying that so long as the government’s actions viewed objectively are 
justified, then they are reasonable “whatever the subjective intent” that motivated the 
relevant officials). 
 52. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (concluding 
that an individual “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, 
objective grounds for doing so” because doing so violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 53. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137 (establishing that “[t]he scheme of the Fourth 
Amendment becomes meaningful only when . . . the conduct of those charged with 
enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 
judge”). 
 54. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 8–14 (discussing the government’s shift in its 
practice of detaining material witnesses after 9/11 to meet the ends of incapacitating 
and investigating terrorists through preventive detention); Bradley A. Parker, 
Comment, Abuse of the Material Witness:  Suspects Detained as Witnesses in Violation of the 
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held as material witnesses rose sharply.55  The FBI began using 
material witness warrants to detain dozens of people suspected of 
being connected to the hijackers, a practice that led to an eighty 
percent increase in material witness arrests from 2000 to 2002.56  Prior 
to the attacks, the government typically used material witness 
warrants to hold individuals suspected of criminal activity for which 
probable cause had not been established.57  After 9/11, the 
government used material witness warrants to detain people whom 
the government suspected had participated in terrorist-related 
crime.58  Moreover, because material witnesses were being held for 
individual investigations, many of those detained were never asked to 
testify.59 
Federal district and appellate courts sitting in New York and 
Virginia were among the first courts to apply the federal material 
witness statute following the 9/11 attacks.60  These courts navigated 
uncharted waters when they confronted material witness detention 
issues connected to national security and terrorism.  Beginning in the 
district courts, judges routinely determined whether to detain 
material witnesses connected to post-9/11 investigations by assessing 
the government’s position as to the materiality and impracticability of 
securing witnesses through means other than arrest.61  Additionally, 
                                                 
Fourth Amendment, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 22, 24–26 (2009) (indicating that the 
government used the material witness statute as part of a new strategy following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks to detain and investigate possible terrorists). 
 55. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 10 (reporting that the American Civil Liberties 
Union and Human Rights Watch’s combined research showed that at least seventy 
individuals were detained as material witnesses out of the 134 detained on federal 
criminal charges); Parker, supra note 54, at 24–26 (confirming the trend cited in the 
Human Rights Watch’s findings); see also BLUM, supra note 40, at 56 (explaining that 
José Padilla was initially held as a material witness even though during the relevant 
litigation, the Bush administration admitted that its primary reason for detaining 
him as a material witness was to find out any and all information he possessed); 
Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200 (highlighting the government’s highly visible use 
of the federal material witness statute to hold suspected terrorists, including several 
high profile 9/11 detainees). 
 56. Klein & Wittes, supra note 13, at 139. 
 57. Id. at 139–40 (citing HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 14). 
 58. Id. at 139. 
 59. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200–02 (commenting that the 
government’s policy of holding witness detainees and not using their testimony 
confirmed that the government was pretextually holding these individuals so that it 
could eventually investigate them for suspected ties to terrorism). 
 60. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Fourth Circuits handled the majority of post-9/11 cases). 
 61. See, e.g., Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the U.S. Attorney’s representation of materiality sufficient 
to detain the witness in a grand jury proceeding); United States v. Finkielstain, No. 
89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (assessing the materiality 
of the detained witness as well as the appropriateness of taking a deposition in lieu of 
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federal district courts held subsequent hearings to weigh the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting material witness warrants to 
determine whether continued detention was appropriate.62 
In subsequent appellate proceedings, most notably in United States 
v. Awadallah63 and Higazy v. Templeton,64 the Second Circuit 
demonstrated an increased willingness to defer to the government’s 
position and allow the detention—or continued detention—of 
material witnesses when national security interests were at stake, even 
while recognizing that the court might not bestow such deference in 
other cases.65  In Awadallah, the U.S. government detained Osama 
Awadallah on a material witness warrant granted by the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.  The warrant was based 
on FBI Special Agent Ryan Plunkett’s supporting affidavit, which 
revealed that the FBI had found Awadallah’s phone number in the 
car of al-Hazmi, a 9/11 hijacker who Awadallah admitted he knew.66  
The FBI also discovered a box-cutter and photos of Osama bin-Laden 
in Awadallah’s car.67  The FBI claimed that it might be difficult to 
secure Awadallah’s grand jury testimony because Awadallah had 
extensive family ties in Jordan and might be a flight risk.68 
                                                 
detaining him); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(determining whether the witness was material to the proceeding and impracticable 
to secure other than through arrest); see also United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 
2d 303, 335–36 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying defendant’s motion for material witness 
warrants due to lack of evidence of materiality and impracticability); United States v. 
Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing when it is appropriate to 
take a deposition rather than detain the witness). 
 62. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding two hearings to 
determine the appropriateness of continued detention); In re Application of the U.S. 
for a Material Witness Warrant, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144, for Material Witness 
No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Material Witness No. 38] 
(describing the hearing that assessed the sufficiency of material witness warrant and 
granting continued detention). 
 63. 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 64. 505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 65. Cf. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 165 (discussing how the district court had prolonged 
Higazy’s detention despite the government’s weak evidentiary showing).  One legal 
commentary suggests that the Second Circuit and lower district courts “allowed great 
deference to the government’s claims that the material witnesses posed a threat to 
national security,” thus justifying their continued detention.  Parker, supra note 54, 
at 28–32.  Parker maintains that the Awadallah II court held that the defendant had 
been properly detained under the federal material witness statute only because the 
court found the material witness warrant valid, which required acknowledging that 
the government had adequately met its burden as to materiality and impracticability.  
Id. at 31–32.  Therefore, Parker observed that the Second Circuit’s holding seemed 
to implicitly defer to government interests in this factual context.  Id. 
 66. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47. 
 67. United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah I), 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96–97, nn.24 
& 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42. 
 68. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47; see also Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 95 
(deferring to Agent Plunkett’s assertion that these facts would make it difficult to 
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After assessing the government’s evidence, the district court 
granted the material witness warrant, although testimony at a later 
hearing revealed that the affidavit included misrepresentations and 
omissions.69  Subsequently, the Second Circuit reviewed Awadallah’s 
claim regarding both the validity of his material witness warrant and 
his prolonged detention and found that it was proper to continue 
holding him—even after excising the affidavit of misrepresentations 
and omissions—because Awadallah did pose a flight risk.70  The court 
found that his connection to one or more of the hijackers and 
possible incentive to avoid appearing before the grand jury overrode 
any assurance that Awadallah would appear as directed.71 
Meanwhile, in Higazy, the Second Circuit reviewed constitutional 
and qualified immunity claims raised by Egyptian national Abdallah 
Higazy concerning his detention as a material witness.72  In Higazy’s 
prior federal district court case, the district court delved into the 
validity of Higazy’s underlying material witness warrant and the 
reasons why the government had misled the court by detaining 
Higazy for multiple ten-day intervals despite not calling him as a 
witness in a grand jury proceeding.73  The district court originally 
authorized Higazy’s detention, even though it found the 
government’s showing to be less than substantial, because the totality 
of the findings demonstrated a significant risk that Higazy would fail 
to voluntarily appear before the grand jury.74  The combined factors 
influencing the district court’s decision included the radio 
transceiver found in Higazy’s hotel room across the street from the 
World Trade Center, and the fact that, although Higazy denied 
ownership of the transceiver, he later admitted to being familiar with 
the device because of his service in the Egyptian Air Corps.75 
                                                 
secure Awadallah’s presence in front of the grand jury without a material witness 
warrant). 
 69. See Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (recounting the facts that were omitted 
from the affidavit:  Awadallah had last seen Al-Hazmi over a year earlier; Awadallah 
had moved from an address associated with the phone number eighteen months 
earlier; he had used the box-cutter recently to install a new carpet in his apartment; 
he had been cooperative with FBI agents in San Diego; and most significantly, 
Awadallah had three brothers who lived in San Diego, one of whom was an American 
citizen). 
 70. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 69–70. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 168, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 73. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(inquiring into the government’s possible misrepresentation based on locating the 
owner of the alleged evidence and discovering false testimony on the part of two 
witnesses). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 358. 
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Ten days later, the district court granted the government’s request 
to continue detaining Higazy even though he had not yet been 
presented to the grand jury.76  Instead, the government formally 
charged him with making false statements to the government by 
initially denying possession of the transceiver.77  Evidence later 
revealed that the radio transceiver actually belonged to an American 
pilot; this evidence prompted the district court to hold a hearing 
inquiring into the parties’ representations to the district court 
regarding Higazy’s confession.78  After the government misled the 
district court twice, the district court found that the government was 
guilty of misconduct and ordered an internal investigation that would 
publicize the results with the goal of deterring future misconduct.79 
C. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd:  Closing the Door on Subjective Intent or Leaving 
the Door Ajar? 
Even though the Higazy hearings promised to start a trend toward 
deterring future misconduct, the Supreme Court’s decision in al-Kidd 
seemed to reverse this course, at least in regard to a material witness’s 
ability to challenge the government’s motive.80  In al-Kidd, the 
government detained al-Kidd while en route to Saudi Arabia claiming 
that al-Kidd had material information about an accused terrorist that 
could only be obtained by detaining al-Kidd as a material witness.81  
Al-Kidd alleged in his petition that after 9/11, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft implemented a policy that authorized federal officials to 
pretextually detain terrorism suspects under the federal material 
witness statutes.82  The Supreme Court held that although al-Kidd’s 
arrest was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, there was 
nevertheless sufficient individualized suspicion supporting the 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 359. 
 77. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
 78. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 359–61. 
 79. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; see also Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 363 
(“The victim we are here concerned with is not the witness, but the Court, which was 
materially misled.  A wrong that so directly impacts the judicial process should not be 
wholly beyond the Court’s power to address.”). 
 80. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (finding al-Kidd’s arrest 
valid because it was objectively justified, regardless of the government’s subjective 
intent). 
 81. Id. at 2079. 
 82. Id.  Al-Kidd, a U.S. citizen with plane tickets to Saudi Arabia, argued that 
federal officials originally secured the material witness warrant for him by claiming 
that he possessed information “crucial” to a suspected terrorist’s prosecution, which 
would be lost if al-Kidd boarded his flight.  Id.  He challenged the constitutionality of 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s alleged policy on Fourth Amendment grounds.  Id. 
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material witness arrest warrant to meet the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” test.83 
Even though the Court seemingly barred a material witness’s ability 
to argue that the government’s subjective intent led it to improperly 
detain a witness under the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not 
address the separate question of whether subjective intent could 
come into play in assessing the validity of a material witness warrant 
under the federal material witness statute.84  The Court effectively 
foreclosed any detainee held under the material witness statute from 
arguing that an officer’s improper motive in detaining him violated 
his Fourth Amendment right because as long as the officer provides 
an objectively valid reason for detaining a material witness, subjective 
intent becomes irrelevant.85  The Court did not, however, rule on the 
question of whether there was a violation of the material witness 
statute in this case; in this way, the Court failed to address the fact 
that al-Kidd could have been subpoenaed, that his testimony could 
have been secured by deposition, and that the underlying material 
witness warrant may have been insufficient.86 
Justice Ginsburg suggested in her concurrence that subjective 
intent might nonetheless be considered in appropriate future cases.87  
Justice Ginsburg found that the Court’s individualized suspicion 
standard—the purported objective and valid basis upholding the 
material witness warrant—suffered from a critical flaw, namely that 
individualized suspicion connoted wrongdoing on the part of the 
                                                 
 83. See id. at 2080–83 (explaining that “reasonableness” is an objective inquiry, 
meaning that if the circumstances viewed objectively justify the challenged action, 
then the action is reasonable regardless of the subjective intent, and finding that 
because individualized suspicion supported al-Kidd’s material witness warrant, the 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 84. See id. at 2083 n.3 (explaining how the Court did not have to rule on a 
statutory argument because in the Court’s view, al-Kidd had conceded the validity of 
the material witness warrant, thus basing its decision on Fourth Amendment 
grounds). 
 85. See id. at 2082–84 (rejecting “a district judge’s ipse dixit of a holding” as 
authority for the proposition that suspects could not be pretextually detained as 
material witnesses). 
 86. See id. at 2083 (passing on the sufficiency of the material witness warrant 
because al-Kidd conceded that the warrant was based on individualized suspicion). 
 87. See id. at 2087–88, 2089 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(finding the material witness warrant invalid because the warrant contained 
omissions and misrepresentations, and concluding that Attorney General Ashcroft 
intended to detain material witnesses “as a means to ‘tak[e] suspected terrorists off the 
street’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  In her concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor also endorsed a subjective intent analysis, suggesting that it might be 
considered in a future case involving the prolonged detention of an individual held 
without probable cause where the government believed he committed a criminal 
offense.  Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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witness rather than necessity for testimony.88  Moreover, Justice 
Ginsburg found al-Kidd’s material witness warrant invalid because the 
government’s findings both as to materiality and impracticability 
were inadequate, which prompted her to invite courts to engage in 
more thorough scrutiny of the government’s showings in any material 
witness warrant.89 
D. Strict Scrutiny in Equal Protection Cases:  How Heightened Scrutiny 
Helps To Identify Improper Motive 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in al-Kidd suggests that district 
courts reviewing material witness warrant applications or the validity 
of authorized warrants should exercise vigilance, remembering that 
the decision to grant arrest is discretionary.90  Such vigilant exercise 
by district courts can draw useful parallels from the equal protection 
context, where a level of heightened scrutiny is employed to screen 
for improper motive on the part of the government.  When the 
government enacts a practice or statute that is deemed “suspect,” like 
a race-based measure, a reviewing court will assess the practice under 
strict scrutiny, which requires the court to uphold the practice or 
statute only if it furthers a compelling governmental interest and uses 
narrowly tailored means to achieve that end.91  For example, in City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,92 the Supreme Court explained that where 
race-based measures are used to address prior discrimination, courts 
apply strict scrutiny because “[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry” 
into the reasons for employing race-based measures, a court cannot 
properly assess whether these classifications are “‘benign’ or 
‘remedial’” and whether they are “in fact motivated by illegitimate 
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”93  The Court indicated 
that the function of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases is to 
‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body 
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool.  The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this 
compelling goal so closely [e.g., narrow tailoring] that there is little 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. (reminding courts that only through “vigilant exercise” of the duty to 
scrutinize a material witness warrant application will the court protect the material 
witness from unnecessary or improper detention). 
 91. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517–18 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 92. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 93. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
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or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.94 
In Croson, the City of Richmond argued that it needed to 
implement a minority “set-aside” program, which required prime 
contractors to allot a fixed percentage of the contract’s total dollar 
amount to minority business enterprise subcontractors in order to 
remedy past discrimination.95  The Court, however, found that the 
program failed to pass muster under strict scrutiny because the city 
did not prove a compelling interest that would justify the program.96  
Specifically, the Court found the city’s factual predicate insufficient 
because it was based on a general finding that showed a history of 
discrimination across the entire construction industry.97  The Court 
felt that this type of broad assertion provided the legislature with no 
guidance to determine the scope of the injury that was to be 
remedied.98  Additionally, the Court held that the plan was not 
narrowly tailored because it was not linked to documented 
discrimination in any meaningful way, and because it failed to 
consider race-neutral means, such as the simplification of bidding 
procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and 
financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races, for 
increasing minority-owned business participation in the construction 
industry.99  Thus the Court’s vigilant exercise of judicial review 
ultimately allowed it to identify the city’s actual motive, which the 
Court identified as likely having been achieving “outright racial 
balancing,” for enacting race-based measures.100 
                                                 
 94. Id. (emphases added). 
 95. See id. at 477–80 (majority opinion) (explaining the city’s argument that 
prior discrimination was responsible for the small number of minority-owned 
businesses in the local construction industry). 
 96. Id. at 498–500. 
 97. Id. at 498–99 (indicating that the city’s argument that the entire Richmond 
construction industry had practiced discrimination failed to precisely define the 
wrong in a way that would allow for any meaningful relief for minority business 
enterprises). 
 98. Id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (providing that broad generalizations do not serve as adequate 
justifications for race-based relief because they have “no logical stopping point”). 
 99. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. 
 100. Id.; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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E. Clear and Convincing Evidence in Civil Cases:  How a Requirement of 
Heightened Evidentiary Showings Better Protects Individual Liberty Interest 
1. Setting the clear and convincing standard 
Similar to the safeguards afforded by strict scrutiny, the civil 
detention context also provides a useful model for material witness 
detention courts to follow when reviewing applications for material 
witness warrants.  Civil detention cases illustrate that requiring a clear 
and convincing standard from the government before authorizing civil 
detention provides significant protection of individual liberty 
interest.101 
For example, Justice Harlan explained that the standard of proof 
in civil detention cases is intended to “‘instruct the factfinder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should 
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication.’”102  The standard serves two functions:  (1) to allocate 
the risk of error between the parties; and (2) to indicate the level of 
relative significance the ultimate decision carries.103  Along this 
spectrum of risk, civil cases between private parties that involve only 
monetary damages are at the low end because society is minimally 
concerned with the fairness of the outcome.  For this reason, a mere 
preponderance of the evidence is the requisite burden of proof,104  
the result of which is that the litigants equally share the risk of 
error.105  At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the interests of the 
criminal defendant that are protected by the constitutional 
requirement that defendants only be found guilty when the state has 
proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, which limits as much as 
possible the likelihood of any error in judgments.106  The 
                                                 
 101.  See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79–80 (1992) (recognizing an 
individual’s liberty interest under the Due Process Clause by requiring that the state 
provide clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness before 
authorizing the individual’s commitment to a mental institution); Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (applying the clear and convincing standard to protect 
the interests of the mentally ill). 
 102. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (asserting that a preponderance of the evidence standard requires only 
that the party bearing the burden convince the factfinder by a fifty-one percent 
likelihood of each element and thus creates an equal risk of error in the outcome by 
both the party bearing the burden of proof and the factfinder). 
 106. See id. at 423–24 (discussing why, given the weighty interests of the 
defendant, society finds it appropriate to impose the highest burden of proof upon 
the government rather than risk possible error by having the defendant shoulder the 
burden of proof). 
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intermediate standard, generally known as clear and convincing 
evidence, protects important individual interests in a number of civil 
cases, including deportation and denaturalization cases.107 
In Addington v. Texas, Frank O’Neal Addington challenged a Texas 
court’s decision that found him mentally ill and committed him to a 
mental institution to protect him from himself and to protect others 
from any danger that he might otherwise pose; the Texas court 
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, whereas 
Addington argued that the court should have used a beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.108  To decide what standard should 
govern in an involuntary commitment case, the Supreme Court 
balanced Addington’s individual interest in freedom from indefinite 
and involuntary confinement against the state’s interest in 
committing to mental institutions individuals who are emotionally 
disturbed and might pose a danger to themselves and others.109  The 
Court noted that of equal importance in the assessment is the 
function of the legal process, the goal of which is to minimize the risk 
of erroneous decisions.110  Thus, in Addington, the Court held that 
Addington’s interest in liberty outweighed the state’s interest in 
protecting the public from the any potential threat he might pose, 
such that due process required a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence to justify his involuntary commitment, though proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt was not constitutionally compelled.111 
                                                 
 107. Id. at 424; see also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (assigning clear 
and convincing evidence as the appropriate standard of proof in deportation cases); 
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (finding the clear and convincing 
standard necessary in deportation cases); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 
118, 125, 159 (1943) (declaring that denaturalization cases merit clear and 
convincing evidence). 
 108. Addington, 441 U.S. at 421–22. 
 109. Id. at 425; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992) 
(reaffirming Addington and finding that to involuntarily commit an individual to a 
mental institution, the state is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and that he poses a danger 
to himself and others); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to 
Standard of Proof Required in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 97 A.L.R. 3D 785, 785 (1980) 
[hereinafter Landis, Modern Status](stating that clear and convincing evidence is the 
appropriate standard of proof where the state involuntarily commits mentally ill and 
dangerous individuals to mental institutions or individuals found unfit to stand 
trials). 
 110. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (suggesting that courts can help minimize 
improper outcomes by factfinders that might harm individual liberty interest by 
imposing higher burdens of proof at initial commitment proceedings); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (discussing that the possible margin of error in 
a freedom of speech case requires that the government bear the burden of proving 
that appellants engaged in criminal speech). 
 111. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 430–31.  But see Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 
(distinguishing criminal cases in which a defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason 
of insanity, and holding that in such instances, the government need not meet the 
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As Addington illustrates, in civil detention cases, the government 
bears the burden of proving under a certain evidentiary standard that 
there is a sufficient state interest in indefinitely committing an 
individual.112  Despite having recognized the importance of individual 
liberty interest, the Supreme Court has, at times, reversed the burden 
of proof when certain factors weigh in favor of the state’s interests 
over the individual’s interests.  In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health,113 for example, an Ohio statute criminalized performing an 
abortion on an unmarried and unemancipated minor except in four 
scenarios, two of which depended on a judicial procedure that might 
allow a minor to bypass the notice and consent provisions.114  To 
utilize the judicial bypass option, the minor had to prove—by clear 
and convincing evidence—an allegation of maturity, a pattern of 
abuse, or an explanation as to why notice was not in her best 
interests.115  The minor, Rachel Roe, raised a facial challenge to the 
statute’s constitutionality, arguing that a bypass procedure should not 
require a minor to prove maturity or best interests by clear and 
convincing evidence because when a state is seeking to infringe on an 
individual’s liberty interest, it is the state that should be saddled with 
the risk of error.116  The Court rejected Roe’s argument and held that 
the state was entitled to impose a heightened evidentiary burden 
because the minor, assisted by an attorney and guardian ad litem, 
would testify unopposed.117 
These cases illustrate how the clear and convincing standard serves 
as a safeguard for important individual and state interests by 
requiring that the party bearing the burden of proof offer a high 
enough quantum of evidence before a court can authorize civil 
detention or alternatively allow the individual’s interest to go 
unopposed where the individual is already protected through certain 
mechanisms.  Applied to material witnesses, clear and convincing 
evidence could similarly require more from the government before 
allowing for any deprivation of liberty. 
                                                 
standard of clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily commit the individual); 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–66 (1983) (relieving the state of its 
evidentiary standard when it involuntarily commits criminal defendants found not 
guilty by reason of insanity). 
 112. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. 
 113. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
 114. Id. at 507–08. 
 115. Id. at 508. 
 116. Id. at 509, 515. 
 117. Id. at 516. 
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2. The clear and convincing standard upon review 
Courts are concerned with the appropriate burden of proof not 
only during initial determinations regarding involuntary 
commitment, but also during periodic review proceedings of an 
individual’s detention.  The state carries the burden of continuing to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the individual both 
presently poses a danger to society and suffers from a mental 
illness.118  Consequently, in some civil detention cases, courts are 
additionally required to periodically review the government’s reasons 
justifying continued commitment of the individual.119  The Supreme 
Court has indicated that regardless of the reason for confinement to 
a mental institution, the individual can only be held so long as he 
continues to be mentally ill and dangerous; the individual cannot be 
held any longer than this.120  Involuntary commitment is therefore 
not constitutionally permissible after the justification for the initial 
commitment ceases to exist.121  Moreover, the individual is entitled to 
periodic review of his condition in order to prevent or cure any risk 
of error in the initial determination that committed the individual to 
the mental institution in the first place.122 
State courts have indicated that many statutes calling for the 
confinement of sexual offenders and sexual psychopaths require 
periodic status hearings because these hearings provide the offender 
with additional procedural safeguards.123  Giving courts additional 
                                                 
 118. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–78 (1992); see In re Det. of Turay, 986 
P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (stating that in annual show cause hearings for 
committed sexual violent predators, the state bears the burden of proving that the 
individual is currently suffering from a mental defect that makes him likely to engage 
in acts of sexual violence). 
 119. See, e.g., Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at 785 (discussing that Texas 
courts are required to periodically review a mental patient’s condition when the state 
has involuntarily committed the patient). 
 120. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77; see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 370 
(1983) (providing that the committed individual can only be confined until “he has 
regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society”); O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that involuntary commitment is 
appropriate only when the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous). 
 121. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
 122. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979) (stating that mentally ill 
patients are provided continuous opportunities to have their confinement reviewed 
thus ensuring that any risk of erroneous confinement is minimized). 
 123. See, e.g., In re Arnold, 292 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that 
periodic review reduces the risk of error); In re Turay, 986 P.2d at 806–07 (providing 
that the state statute mandates that sexually violent predators receive an annual 
review hearing); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Standard of Proof Required Under 
Statute Providing for Commitment of Sexual Offenders or Sexual Psychopaths, 96 A.L.R. 840, 
845 (1979) [hereinafter Landis, Standard of Proof].  Unlike sexually violent predators 
(SVP), mentally ill individuals committed under other statutes receive review every 
180 days rather than annually because the course of treatment for the mentally ill 
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opportunities to review whether to extend an individual’s involuntary 
commitment ensures that the state can continue to show that the 
sexual offender poses an ongoing danger to others due to a mental 
abnormality or mental disorder.124  However, once the individual has 
been treated adequately and cleared by personnel at the relevant 
facility, such that he no longer poses a danger to himself or others, 
the original reason for holding him is no longer valid and the court is 
required to release the individual.125 
The material witness statute serves as a mechanism for ensuring 
that the testimony of witnesses, who possess material information 
related to criminal proceedings and who pose a flight risk, is secured 
by authorizing detention of these witnesses.126  However, the 
government’s burden in showing that a material witness is both 
material and impracticable is not a clearly established burden, as 
illustrated by the varying federal case law.127  What is clear is that a 
material witness can only effectively ask whether the government was 
improperly motivated when seeking a material witness’s arrest 
through the federal material witness statute because the Supreme 
Court has foreclosed any discussion of subjective intent under the 
Fourth Amendment after al-Kidd.128 
However, a material witness still has the ability to raise subjective 
intent and argue pretextual detention by arguing that the 
government has not met its burden under the federal material 
witness statute.  Because no clear burden attaches to these showings, 
                                                 
differs significantly from that of SVPs, and because SVPs pose a higher public safety 
threat given that they have committed at least one sexually violent act.  In re Turay, 
986 P.2d at 807. 
 124. See, e.g., In re Turay, 986 P.2d at 813–14 (holding that the state must continue 
to prove at an annual show cause hearing that the sexual offender is suffering from a 
mental disorder that would make him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if 
released into the community or discharged from treatment). 
 125. See Landis, Standard of Proof, supra note 123, at 842 (indicating that sexual 
offenders or sexual psychopaths can only be committed so long as they remain a 
danger to others because the relevant statutes are intended to both protect society 
from ongoing danger and to treat the individual). 
 126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (“If it appears . . . that the testimony of a person 
is material in a criminal proceeding, and it is shown that it may become 
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer 
may order the arrest of the person . . . .”). 
 127. Compare United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(holding that the impracticability prong was met where several subpoena attempts 
were unsuccessful), with Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 944 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(determining that the impracticable prong was not satisfied even though the witness 
had access to a large sum of cash, contact with the fugitive, and was captured on the 
rooftop of a building). 
 128. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011) (holding that 
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment is determined by an objective test and 
that the subjective intent motivating officials is irrelevant). 
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though, the civil detention context illustrates how in arguing 
subjective intent, material witnesses would greatly benefit from 
requiring the government to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that these witnesses are material and impracticable at the time the 
government requests a material witness warrant because a higher 
initial burden of proof helps protect individual liberty interest.  And 
assuming these warrants are granted, material witnesses would 
equally gain from having courts review their material witness warrants 
under a higher standard of review because, as strict scrutiny illustrates 
in the equal protection standard, the higher the standard of judicial 
review, the greater the court’s ability to identify improper motive on 
the government’s part. 
II. UNDER THE FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE, COURTS 
SHOULD CONDITION GRANTING AND REVIEWING MATERIAL WITNESS 
WARRANTS ON CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO PROTECT THE 
WITNESS’S LIBERTY INTEREST, SCREEN FOR IMPROPER MOTIVE, AND 
OBTAIN ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROLONGED DETENTION 
Courts should implement the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard employed in civil detention cases in the material witness 
context because it will allow courts to require concrete showings of 
materiality and impracticability when the government applies for a 
material witness warrant, which is necessary because of the particular 
liberty interest at stake.129  If a court grants the material witness 
warrant, then at the material witness’s first hearing, the court should 
proceed to review the underlying warrant under a heightened 
standard of review, much like courts do in the equal protection 
context when they use strict scrutiny, so that the court may 
thoroughly assess whether the witness has in fact been held for 
testimony in a future criminal proceeding or instead, for individual 
                                                 
 129. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(proposing a bill to replace the material witness statute that would require that the 
government show probable cause that the witness has been served with a subpoena 
and failed or refused to appear as required, or else prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the service of a subpoena is likely to result in flight risk, in order for a 
court to grant a material witness warrant).  Senator Leahy’s bill would accomplish 
what this Comment proposes—convincing or dissuading the court for a second time 
that the government has fully met its evidentiary burden, and identifying instances of 
pretextual detention—by only authorizing detention where there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the witness may flee or fail to appear in court and by 
prolonging that detention only if continued clear and convincing proof is shown that 
“such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the witness as required.”  
See S. 1739, 109th Cong. § 1(a)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(A) (2005) (2005) (requiring 
clear and convincing evidence for initial and continued detention). 
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investigation in contravention of the statute’s purpose.130  Lastly, even 
if the warrant passes muster under this stricter standard of review, 
courts can nonetheless hold periodic hearings to demand that the 
government show why the witness continues to pose a flight risk and 
present what diligent efforts it is taking to hold the witness under the 
least restrictive means possible.131 
A.  Requiring Clear and Convincing Showings of Materiality and 
Impracticability in Applications for Material Witness Warrants Protects the 
Material Witness’s Significant Liberty Interest in Otherwise One-Sided 
Proceedings 
A court can appropriately require a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence, following the standards of proof in civil 
detention cases, before granting a material witness warrant because 
the determination is made at a non-adversarial ex parte proceeding.132  
At a material witness warrant proceeding, only the government 
presents its position, and no other party has the opportunity to voice 
opposition on the material witness’s behalf.133  For example, in Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, the Supreme Court approved a state’s 
requirement that a minor prove maturity or best interests by clear 
and convincing evidence before allowing a bypass procedure to 
parental notice of an abortion, particularly because judicial bypass 
procedures occurred at ex parte proceedings where the minor’s 
testimony went unopposed.134  Similarly, applications for material 
                                                 
 130. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining why heightened scrutiny helps to uncover the root of the 
government’s motive in taking a certain action). 
 131. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,944 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(recommending that courts conduct periodic reviews to ensure that material 
witnesses continue to pose a flight risk meriting extended detention). 
 132. Cf. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990) 
(upholding the clear and convincing evidentiary standard that a minor must meet to 
obtain judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement under the Ohio 
abortion statute).  Non-adversarial ex parte proceeding refers to a court hearing 
where only one party is represented, thus eliminating the proceeding’s otherwise 
adversarial nature.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2012).  For that 
reason, ex parte communications are often banned under statute and enforced by 
courts.  See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2006) (banning ex parte communications by any 
interested person outside of the relevant administrative agency on the merits of the 
issue). 
 133. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 197, 201 (describing that material witnesses 
can be subjected to arrest and detention solely on the basis of the government’s 
statement). 
 134. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (accepting the clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard and further noting that the Court’s precedent does 
not require a lower standard, and that the minor was aided by both an attorney and a 
guardian ad litem). 
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witness warrants merit a clear and convincing standard of proof 
because courts determine whether to grant material witness warrants 
at ex parte hearings where the government alone presents its case 
and the material witness is not afforded representation or the 
corresponding ability to question the government’s showings.135 
However, unlike judicial bypass procedure cases where the Court 
has found the state’s interest to override a minor’s individual liberty 
interest, the situation for material witnesses is reversed because the 
testimony of the government goes unopposed.136  Regardless of 
whether it is the government or the material witness that is not 
represented, the underlying concern remains the same:  The party 
not represented is not there to present a position, which may include 
controverting and presenting evidence against what is being argued 
before the court at a one-sided proceeding.137  Therefore, a court can 
appropriately require the unopposed party to shoulder a heavier 
burden of proof to balance the otherwise lopsided nature of the 
proceeding.138 
Not only does the clear and convincing standard afford protection 
to the unrepresented party, like a material witness, but it also helps 
inform a court’s full and fair assessment of whether a material witness 
is both material to a criminal proceeding and impracticable to secure 
through a subpoena as required under the federal material witness 
                                                 
 135. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (basing the material 
witness warrant solely on the affidavit of the investigating FBI agent); In re Francisco 
M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (granting the government’s ex parte 
motion to detain Francisco as a material witness based only on the detective’s 
declaration). 
 136. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (explaining that an attorney 
and a guardian ad litem accompany the minor at the judicial bypass hearing); 
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes 
Requiring Parental Notification of or Consent to Minor’s Abortion, 77 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 152–53 
(2000) (reasoning that the Court in Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health allowed the minor to 
carry the burden of proof through clear and convincing evidence because she alone 
would present testimony at the judicial bypass hearing and she would be represented 
by an attorney and a guardian ad litem).  But see Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47 
(describing that the government’s interests alone were represented by the Assistant 
United States Attorney at the ex parte material witness warrant proceeding). 
 137. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (suggesting that the state was 
the disadvantaged party because “the bypass procedure contemplates an ex parte 
proceeding at which no one opposes the minor’s testimony”); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 
at 47 (leaving open whether Awadallah’s absence may have harmed his ability to 
challenge the findings presented by Agent Plunkett and the Assistant United States 
Attorney before the district court as to why Awadallah could be properly detained). 
 138. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (rejecting a challenge to the 
heightened standard of proof imposed on a minor seeking a judicial bypass 
procedure where she was represented by an attorney and a guardian ad litem and 
the state was not represented at all). 
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statute.139  The heightened standard provides a fuller factual picture 
for the court because it requires the government to show more than 
conclusory assertions as to both the materiality prong and the 
impracticability prong.140  Under the current standard, a presiding 
judge issues a material witness warrant based on the government’s 
application, which is supported by affidavits crafted by U.S. attorneys 
or other government agents.141  Consequently, courts tend to credit 
the government’s position in the material witness warrant application 
for lack of a differing view.142 
In addition to the one-sided nature of the relevant proceeding, the 
interest at stake for the material witness is critical in determining the 
standard of proof that should govern.143  In Addington, the Court 
recognized that the liberty interest of individuals committed to 
mental institutions require the state to provide clear and convincing 
evidence before an involuntary commitment may be authorized.144  
Similar to the interests of involuntarily committed individuals, 
material witnesses have an important liberty interest at stake in 
                                                 
 139. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(recommending that material witness warrants be issued if the court is convinced by 
the government’s clear and convincing showing that the witness is likely to flee or 
cannot be adequately secured through means other than arrest). 
 140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (failing to require a particular standard of proof 
as to materiality and impracticability showings).  But see 151 CONG. REC. 20,944 
(2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (proposing that material witnesses only be 
held for additional periods when the government can demonstrate through clear 
and convincing evidence that the witness poses a flight risk, and suggesting that the 
court take into account the witness’s history and characteristics in determining 
whether to release or continue detaining the witness). 
 141. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47 (granting a material witness warrant 
based on an FBI agent’s affidavit even though the witness had been arrested three 
hours earlier); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (issuing 
a material witness warrant based on declarations made by investigating officer 
Detective Arroyo, who filed the material witness warrant application before the 
court). 
 142. See supra notes 65–76 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (cautioning that Foucha 
had a significant liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint, which would by 
definition be denied by virtue of being involuntarily committed); Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 515–16 (concluding that a clear and convincing standard 
was appropriate); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 427 (1979) (noting that 
civil commitment for any purpose substantially deprives the individual of a liberty 
interest, meriting due process protection and overriding the state’s interest); see also 
Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at 785–86 (discussing that both the mentally ill 
and those found unfit to stand trial hold important liberty interests in the outcome 
of their civil commitment proceedings); Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at 
785–86 (stating that some courts acknowledge that sex offenders who are convicted 
of a sex offense that may be punished by any period of imprisonment have a critical 
liberty interest at stake to justify a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 144. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 433 (holding that the trial court’s instruction 
based on a clear and convincing evidence standard did not violate Addington’s due 
process rights). 
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material witness warrant proceedings because the court’s 
determination can result in the witness’s arrest and incarceration.145  
Compare for example, Addington and Osama Awadallah—the 
student detained following the 9/11 attacks.  Both Addington and 
Awadallah had an interest in not being deprived of their liberty.146  
Further, both men had an interest in being free of the collateral 
impacts of detention, which could endure long after release.  For 
Awadallah, detention jeopardized his college education, putting his 
future ability to achieve a certain level of success and prosperity at 
risk, while for Addington, detention forced him to carry the stigma 
associated with having been involuntarily committed.147  For these 
reasons, a court determining whether to issue a material witness 
warrant should consider and protect the witness’s liberty interest by 
only authorizing a witness’s arrest where the government meets the 
clear and convincing standard.148 
Courts generally acknowledge that materiality is a low bar to meet 
and will be satisfied so long as the government shows that the 
witness’s testimony is central to the proceeding and not merely 
duplicative of other witness testimony or impeachment evidence.149  
                                                 
 145. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200 (reporting that the government has 
detained dozens of individuals since 9/11 and many were subjected to harsh 
treatment). 
 146. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–27 (describing that Addington possessed an 
individual interest in not being involuntarily confined for an indefinite period and 
an individual interest in avoiding an erroneous and inappropriate commitment); 
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 45–46 (revisiting Awadallah’s story as a college student in 
San Diego who was concerned about missing class when he discovered he would be 
subject to interrogation by FBI agents). 
 147. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26 (recognizing the importance of protecting 
against the unavoidable labeling that accompanies one who is involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 45–46 (noting that 
Awadallah missed class as a result of his interrogation); see also Ray Rivera & Matthew 
Sweeney, Acquaintance of 2 Hijackers is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2006), 
www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/nyregion/18immigrant.html (discussing the fact that 
Awadallah was a college student prior to his detention and that he subsequently 
obtained a college degree). 
 148. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows:  Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 722 (2009) (highlighting that material witnesses have a 
substantial “constitutional interest in minimizing nonpunitive restrictions on 
individual liberty” that merits careful consideration before granting detention). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (determining that testimony from an accountant who 
created shell corporations allegedly used by the defendants to commit fraud 
qualified as material); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 
1976) (finding that the government had established probable cause that Feingold’s 
testimony was material because Feingold had appeared as a witness before the grand 
jury that indicted the defendant for income tax evasion, and Feingold had signed 
checks totaling $50,000 payable to the XYZ Collection Company, of which defendant 
was the sole proprietor); see also Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144, Governing Arrest and Detention of 
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Because the government can satisfy materiality by showing that it is 
reasonably probable that the witness’s testimony is material to a 
criminal proceeding, the government’s burden of proof operates like 
a preponderance of the evidence standard.150  Courts tend to apply 
this lower standard by crediting the government’s assertions about 
how material the witness may be—particularly in grand jury cases—
when these representations are made by detectives, FBI agents, 
federal prosecutors, and other government officials.151  The tendency 
of courts to defer to the government often leads to findings of 
materiality based on minimal proof.152  Consequently, the heightened 
standard of clear and convincing evidence is necessary to safeguard 
against instances where materiality might not be satisfied.  For 
example, the threshold may not be met where a witness’s supposed 
materiality is either cumulative of other testimony or insufficiently 
                                                 
Material Witnesses to Federal Crimes, 2 A.L.R. FED. 2D 425, 442 (2005) (illustrating 
how the witness’s participation in grand jury proceedings and personal 
involvement in certain transactions rendered his testimony material (citing 
Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 627)). 
 150. See Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 272 (Tex. App. 2005) (explaining that 
a preponderance of the evidence is the equivalent of a reasonable medical 
probability for purposes of medical malpractice); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. e (2010) (citing Morrell, 184 
S.W.3d at 271–72). 
 151. See, e.g., In re de Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983) (determining 
that the government proved materiality when it claimed that the witness’s testimony 
was material to a grand jury indictment); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 
(7th Cir. 1982) (finding that materiality in grand jury proceedings was satisfied based 
only on a representation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office that the detainee’s 
testimony was material); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(establishing materiality of the testimony was satisfied by the “mere statement” of a 
responsible government official claiming the testimony was material); Feingold, 416 F. 
Supp. at 628 (crediting the assertions of Special Agent Merino asserting that 
Feingold could give testimony that was material); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (accepting Detective Arroyo’s declarations that Francisco, 
the material witness, had been present in the murder victim’s car thus making him 
material to criminal proceedings regarding the murder).  A government official’s 
representation as to materiality is sufficient in the grand jury context because it 
“strikes a proper and adequate balance between protecting the secrecy of the grand 
jury’s investigation and subjecting an individual to an unjustified arrest.”  Oliver, 683 
F.2d at 231; see also Rosenhouse, supra note 149, at 441–44 (discussing the previously 
cited cases as examples of when and how the materiality prong of the federal 
material witness statute is satisfied). 
 152. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (illustrating that courts often 
credit the government’s showings, particularly with respect to materiality 
determinations).  But see Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 59 (balancing the government’s 
interest in investigating the conspirators who carried out the 9/11 attacks against 
the witness’s liberty interest to determine reasonability of detention and 
concluding that the federal material witness statute sufficiently minimizes any 
intrusion on the material witness’s liberty while properly accounting for the 
government’s “countervailing interests”).  The court found that materiality is met 
based on a totality of the circumstances, where the government’s evidence 
supported the inference that the witness knew one of the 9/11 hijackers.  
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70. 
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particularized to demonstrate that the information possessed by the 
witness is adequately relevant to the case.153 
On the other hand, the impracticability prong generally requires a 
slightly higher burden of proof because the statute’s terms require 
that witnesses be secured by subpoena in the first instance and 
detained only where a subpoena has failed or will likely fail to secure 
the witness’s presence.154  Therefore, courts authorize detaining a 
material witness only when the witness poses a flight risk.155  Even 
though the statute suggests that impracticability is a weightier 
assessment, courts often grant material witness warrants where it is 
more probable than not that the witness will flee rather than 
requiring the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the witness is likely to flee.156 
                                                 
 153. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that the affidavit used to secure al-Kidd’s 
detention failed to provide an adequate basis for the material witness warrant as to 
materiality because the government “did not state with particularity the information 
al-Kidd purportedly possessed” that would make him material to the government’s 
prosecution of defendant Sami Omar al-Hussayen); United States v. Basciano, 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 303, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (declaring that even if the identities of two 
material witnesses, CW-2 and CW-3, were known, there was not a proper showing that 
their testimony would be material to the case because the testimony could just as 
easily be “merely cumulative of CW-1’s” or another witness’s testimony or other 
impeachment evidence). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); see supra Part I.A.1 (explaining the showings 
required to meet impracticability under the federal material witness statute). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 
 156. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that the government’s representation in the affidavit underlying the material 
witness warrant failed the impracticability prong where the only representation made 
was unelaborate and consisted of a statement that al-Kidd would travel to Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. government would be unable to secure his presence by 
subpoena); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 77 (Straub, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(determining that the government failed to meet the impracticability prong where 
the redacted affidavit did not adequately show Awadallah was a flight risk).  But see 
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70 (majority opinion) (finding that impracticability is met 
where Awadallah did not step forward to share information he had about one or 
more of the hijackers, thus suggesting a risk of flight); In re de Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d at 
357 (holding that the material witness warrant was properly issued on the premise 
that the appellant had avoided service of several subpoenas ordering him to give 
testimony before the grand jury thus making it impracticable to secure his presence 
by subpoena); United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (accepting that it would be impracticable to secure the 
witness through subpoena because Lecueder was a Uruguayan citizen scheduled to 
leave the United States well in advance of the defendant’s trial); Feingold, 416 F. 
Supp. at 629 (granting the material witness warrant based on Marino’s affidavit 
showing unsuccessful attempts to serve Feingold with a subpoena either through 
Feingold’s attorney or on seven different days at his home). 
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Material witnesses have an equal if not higher interest in being free 
from undue constraint than their civilly detained counterparts.157  
First, material witnesses are detained because they can provide critical 
information in criminal proceedings, not because they pose a danger 
to others.158  Material witnesses constitute the unrepresented party at 
the very hearing determining whether to grant their detention.159  
Consequently, material witnesses should be afforded the same level of 
assurance that the court will only allow the government to detain 
them on a clear and convincing showing of materiality and 
impracticability.160 
B. Reviewing Material Witness Warrants Under a Higher Standard of 
Review “Smokes Out” Pretextual Use of the Material Witness Statute and 
Prevents Courts from Unjustifiably Deferring to Government Interests 
Material witnesses have a significant liberty interest that justifies 
both application of a higher evidentiary standard at the initial 
determination hearing that precedes detention as well as to heightened 
judicial scrutiny of their material witness warrants following 
detention.161  Unlike defendants, material witnesses are not held 
because they are suspected of or have committed a crime;162 to the 
                                                 
 157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining how the material 
witness’s duty to disclose information is high enough to warrant infringing on the 
witness’s liberty interest). 
 158. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (explaining that a material 
witness can be detained because the witness possesses knowledge of a crime, not 
because the witness is suspected of engaging in crime or because the witness may 
pose a danger to the community). 
 159. See supra notes 132–33, 135–36 and accompanying text (discussing the nature 
of the initial material witness warrant proceedings). 
 160. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text (providing the circumstances 
under which clear and convincing evidence is warranted).  But see supra note 156 
(specifying instances where a clear and convincing standard would not be 
appropriate if it would preclude finding impracticability where the government 
made reasonable efforts to subpoena or genuinely showed flight risk).  In cases 
where a material witness has avoided service of a subpoena or is imminently 
scheduled to leave the country with no clear prospect of returning, a higher 
evidentiary burden might otherwise inhibit the government’s ability to hold witnesses 
who are critical to the government’s case and unavailable for testimony through 
other means.  See supra note 156. 
 161. Part II.B focuses on entirely separate proceedings than those discussed in 
Part II.A.  Where Part II.A targeted proceedings where the court is determining 
whether to issue a material witness warrant at all, e.g., authorize detention, Part II.B 
hones in on hearings where the court is determining whether to continue 
authorizing detention.  Thus, Part II.B is directed at the validity of the material 
witness warrant rather than the determination to issue the warrant. 
 162. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (taking issue with the majority’s emphasis on the 
validity of the material witness warrant, which was based on individualized suspicion, 
because it implied that al-Kidd had engaged in wrongdoing); see also Cole, supra note 
148, at 722 (stating that the federal material witness statute allows detention not 
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contrary, the material witness statute “does not ‘involv[e] suspicion, 
or lack of suspicion,’ of the individual so identified.”163  
Consequently, a material witness’s interest in liberty is seriously at 
risk, and failing to employ heightened judicial review at this separate 
and subsequent stage of the process could allow the government to 
continue holding witnesses for which the government lacks probable 
cause to charge with a crime.164  Therefore, in failing to apply a 
heightened standard of judicial review, a court can specifically 
contravene the federal material witness statute by allowing for 
detention of a material witness on less than adequate grounds.165 
If, upon review, a court grants continued detention by effectively 
rubberstamping the government’s previously authorized material 
witness warrant, then the court may less easily distinguish cases where 
the government seeks to detain a witness for individual investigation 
rather than for testimony.166  Deferring to the government’s position a 
second time, rather than requiring ongoing clear and convincing 
evidence of materiality and impracticability when reviewing a 
material witness warrant, presupposes that the government is 
continuing to hold the witness for its stated reasons.167  In practice, 
                                                 
because of alleged criminal activity on the part of the witness, but only for the 
purpose of ensuring testimony in a criminal proceeding); Klein & Wittes, supra note 
13, at 133 (arguing that the material witness statute qualifies as “the most purely 
preventive detention authority” because its targets are unindicted, it does not specify 
a maximum length of permissible detention, and the purpose of the statute is to 
prevent the harm a fleeing witness inflicts rather than the threat the witness might 
pose to public safety); Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 199 (highlighting that the 
federal material witness statute is controversial specifically because it involves 
imprisoning individuals who are not charged with a crime). 
 163. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004)). 
 164. See Cole, supra note 148, at 722 (stressing that the federal material witness 
statute is not intended to indefinitely allow detention of suspicious individuals under 
criminal investigation, thus implying that courts should carefully consider their 
decision to prevent this from occurring). 
 165. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(pointing out that the material witness law is founded on a narrow purpose, which is 
solely to hold witnesses for testimony and not to hold witnesses as criminal suspects). 
 166. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing that the reviewing 
judge, who had presided over the initial hearing authorizing Awadallah’s arrest, 
granted Awadallah’s prolonged detention because it was “reasonable under the 
circumstances”).  By the time of the second hearing, the government had not only 
arrested Awadallah before the court sanctioned the action but also left out key pieces 
of information that would have minimized Awadallah’s flight risk and possibly 
secured his release.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47 (noting that the district court judge at the 
October 2, 2001 hearing declined to release Awadallah following his transfer to 
New York, finding his detention “reasonable under the circumstances” with no 
indication that the judge reviewed the September 21, 2001 arrest warrant or the 
September 25, 2001 order denying bail and ordering Awadallah’s transfer when 
deciding to deny release). 
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such sustained deference can operate like a rebuttable presumption 
favoring detention, defeated only by evidence to the contrary 
presented by the material witness.168  In certain factual contexts, like 
in the aftermath of a breach of national security, the government may 
make overly generalized assertions that a witness continues to be 
material to mask its actual intent to hold the individual until it can 
gather sufficient evidence to charge the witness with a crime.169  
Consequently, failing to review a material witness warrant under a 
clear and convincing standard may lead to increased pretextual 
detention, whereas the government might otherwise be deterred to 
prolong detention if it knew that a higher standard of review hung in 
the balance.170 
Concerns regarding pretext do not only arise in the material 
witness context.  Extrapolating from the equal protection context, 
where courts apply strict scrutiny when reviewing race-based remedial 
measures that are by nature suspect, a court can similarly review a 
material witness warrant under the clear and convincing standard.  
This is because the warrant is similarly suspect, as it was previously 
granted at a one-sided proceeding where the government carried a 
low evidentiary burden.171  Therefore, this Comment argues that 
applying a clear and convincing standard of review would accomplish 
two goals.  First, it would convince the court for a second time that 
the government has fully met its evidentiary burden or poke holes 
                                                 
 168. See id. (stating that Awadallah’s continued detention was “reasonable under 
the circumstances” where the circumstances relied on by the court included its 
initial reasons to detain that were based “solely on the contents of Agent Plunkett’s 
[the FBI agent] affidavit”).  Awadallah could have had a colorable argument for 
challenging his detention if his attorney had highlighted the contradicting 
information. 
 169. See HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (raising the specter that the post-9/11 
increased detention of material witnesses suggests that the government often held 
witnesses who the government believed may have participated in terrorism directly as 
opposed to only possessing information about terrorism); Klein & Wittes, supra note 
13, at 139–40. 
 170. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (suggesting that courts can deal with excessive 
deference, which often leads to pretextual detention, by raising the standards used to 
determine whether a material witness actually poses a flight risk).  In Awadallah, if 
the Second Circuit had applied a heightened standard of review, then it could only 
have authorized Awadallah’s continued detention based on express findings by the 
government showing why Awadallah posed a flight risk.  Id. at 36. 
 171. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (noting 
that in the equal protection context, the conclusory statement offered by the state 
alleging the existence of racial discrimination requires careful and heightened 
scrutiny as opposed to a remedy founded on a respective statute’s clear legislative 
purpose); see also Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 197, 201 (describing that material 
witnesses are subject to arrest and detention based exclusively on the government’s 
evidence, offered ex parte). 
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where it has not, and second, it would separate instances of pretext 
from legitimate cases of prolonged detention.172 
As Croson illuminates, heightened judicial review helps to smoke 
out pretext because by applying heightened scrutiny, the court 
exposes the government’s findings to a searching judicial inquiry into 
whether it offered concrete reasons for treating a class of individuals 
in a certain way rather than the court relying on a statement that the 
measures the government used are benign.173  Similarly, applying 
searching judicial inquiry at hearings on motions to quash material 
witness warrants would give the court a chance to evaluate the 
underlying material witness warrant with a more critical eye than the 
judge who previously granted the warrant in an expedited ex parte 
hearing.174 
In material witness cases, the government often claims that a 
witness continues to be material to criminal proceedings and yet fails 
to call the witness or explain the delay.175  Doing so suggests either 
that the witness was being held, pending individual investigation, or 
that the witness’s materiality and impracticability had been 
exaggerated.176  The government likely overstates its case or fails to 
provide an explanation for not calling a witness because doing so 
facilitates prolonged detention without necessarily requiring further 
investigation into whether it is necessary, arguably an administrative 
                                                 
 172. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(requiring the government to show through clear and convincing evidence at the 
material witness’s hearing that no condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably secure the witness’s appearance at a pending criminal proceeding to 
ensure that the witness is only held for testimony and not for individual criminal 
investigation). 
 173. See id. (discussing that in the equal protection context, the Court applies 
strict scrutiny because doing so helps identify instances where the state is 
implementing race-based remedial measures, and arguing that such measures are 
authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment but never specifically showing why and 
how that is so). 
 174. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing that courts can 
appropriately require clear and convincing evidence from the unilaterally 
represented party to provide an additional safeguard to the otherwise unrepresented 
party).  By implication, if the clear and convincing standard protects the 
unrepresented party at the initial determination, it follows that those interests would 
similarly be protected by using the same standard upon review.  See In re Det. of 
Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (demanding the same standard of clear 
and convincing evidence for insanity and dangerousness when authorizing the initial 
involuntary commitment upon review of confinement). 
 175. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(noting that the material witness was never called to testify before the grand jury 
despite the court granting the government’s request for prolonged detention). 
 176. See id. at 359 (explaining that rather than present the witness to the grand 
jury, the government instead charged the witness with making “material false 
statements” for denying that the witness possessed the radio transceiver, which 
arguably calls into question the materiality and impracticability of the witness). 
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convenience to the government.177  Moreover, extending a witness’s 
detention may also give the government a chance to establish 
probable cause to charge the witness with a crime.178 
Reviewing a material witness warrant under a relatively relaxed 
level of scrutiny can lead to unnecessarily prolonged detention or to 
pretextual use of the material witness statute.179  However, heightened 
review of materiality and impracticability can spare a material witness 
from a prolonged detention.180  In both the equal protection and the 
material witness contexts, courts can reach thoroughly reasoned 
decisions that do not immediately credit the government’s assertions 
by applying a heightened standard of judicial review.181  For example, 
unlike Croson, where the Court rejected the city’s claim that its race-
based measures helped remedy racial discrimination as overbroad, 
the Second Circuit in Awadallah required more than a mere assertion 
but nonetheless credited the government’s claim that specific facts in 
the affidavit showing the FBI agent’s personal knowledge of the 
materiality of Awadallah’s testimony was sufficient to prove 
materiality rather than probing further into the facts that arguably 
made Awadallah material to a criminal proceeding.182  In other cases 
                                                 
 177. See supra notes 25, 59, 76 and accompanying text (describing instances where 
the government held the material witness for extended periods, at least one of which 
required multiple stages of review and continued approval by the court). 
 178. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 13–14 (noting that the DOJ prolonged 
detention of material witnesses to investigate possible terrorist activity and that the 
courts furthered this end by establishing a review procedure of material witness 
warrants that amounted to a mere formality). 
 179. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (implying that because the affidavit underlying al-
Kidd’s material witness warrant was devoid of any concrete showings of materiality 
and impracticability, it is arguable that al-Kidd was held pretextually by the 
government). 
 180. Id. (reasoning that if reviewing courts employed a more searching inquiry of 
the government’s reasons supporting a witness’s materiality and impracticability, they 
could avoid detention altogether or lessen its duration). 
 181. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–08 (1989) 
(evaluating the City of Richmond’s set aside plan under strict scrutiny, which 
required that the state demonstrate a compelling interest in having such a plan as 
well as facts demonstrating that the plan was narrowly tailored); Awadallah II, 349 
F.3d 42, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring specific facts tending to prove materiality 
rather than accepting a “mere statement” of materiality by a government official 
alone); see also Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 206–07 (commenting on how the 
approach to materiality in Awadallah provides a more probing analysis than the Bacon 
“mere statement” rule, which lacked constitutional requirements for findings of 
particularity and an independent judicial determination). 
 182. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 498–99 (concluding that the city’s plan provided 
no more than a generalized assertion of past discrimination in the construction 
industry, which was insufficient to justify the proposed remedy), with Awadallah II, 
349 F.3d at 65–66 (deciding that FBI Agent Plunkett’s assertions showing specific 
involvement with the agents who personally dealt with Awadallah, coupled with 
Agent Plunkett’s involvement in other indictments and convictions as part of an 
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where the government repeatedly failed to call the material witness to 
testify, if the reviewing court had applied a heightened standard of 
review, it could have potentially avoided unnecessary extended 
detainment by pressing the government for concrete reasons why the 
witness had not yet been called to testify as well as the particular 
reasons why it might be necessary to continue holding the witness.183 
Because both materiality and impracticability are fact-driven 
assessments that are subject to change based on new information, the 
government has an implied duty to continue making its case for 
detention.184  At the second hearing following Egyptian national 
Higazy’s detention as a material witness after the government had 
connected him to the radio transceiver, the court learned that the 
government had not presented Higazy to the grand jury and required 
the government to provide the court with further information 
justifying Higazy’s continued detention.185  The court required this 
additional showing in recognition of its duty not to further detain a 
material witness without an adequate basis for doing so.186  
Nonetheless, the court granted an extended detention based on what 
was later discovered to be a false confession.187  However, under a 
clear and convincing evidence review of the material witness warrant, 
the court would likely have discovered that the underlying confession 
was false and obtained through coercion.188  Alternatively, if the 
government knew it would be held to a clear and convincing 
                                                 
ongoing investigation into the 9/11 attacks, sufficiently established materiality).  The 
Second Circuit greatly emphasized the personal knowledge element of Agent 
Plunkett’s assertions in the affidavit, which may have imposed a stricter standard on 
the government than the “mere statement” rule used by prior courts, and the court 
subsequently decided that the government had established probable cause to find 
Awadallah material based on Agent Plunkett’s representations.  Awadallah II, 349 
F.3d at 65–66, 69–70.  Arguably, however, the court’s determination fell short of a 
searching inquiry into whether a 9/11 hijacker’s possession of Awadallah’s phone 
number along with Awadallah living close to one of the hijackers showed a 
compelling enough reason to make Awadallah material to a criminal proceeding and 
to warrant his continued arrest. 
 183. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(describing that material witness Higazy was not called to testify before a grand jury 
despite being detained for multiple ten day intervals). 
 184. See, e.g., id. at 359 (requiring that the government provide the court with 
further information, after the initial ten day period to hold and call witness Higazy 
had passed, to see what, if any, new information may have surfaced to warrant further 
detention). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) (detailing that 
Higazy admitted that he had lied during the confession); Material Witness No. 38, 214 
F. Supp. 2d at 360 (indicating that Higazy’s counsel made allegations of the coercive 
and deceptive nature in which the government obtained the confession). 
CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:48 PM 
2012] TEXT AND PRETEXT 371 
standard of review, it may have provided additional support showing 
why the confession itself necessarily proved not only that Higazy was 
material, but also that there were specific reasons why Higazy posed a 
flight risk that warranted his continued detention.189 
As Higazy’s case illustrates, a relaxed standard of review allows a 
reviewing court to assume that the government’s measures are in fact 
designed to further the government’s stated goal, and thus, the court 
fails to hold the government accountable.190  Even though remedying 
racial discrimination or ensuring testimony at trial may serve the 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause and the material witness 
statute respectively, in both contexts the court cannot adequately 
review the underlying measure “without first engaging in an 
examination of the factual basis for its enactment and the nexus 
between its scope and that factual basis . . . .”191  Applying relaxed 
scrutiny can lead to courts failing to engage in the kind of intense 
examination of governmental purpose that courts would otherwise 
exercise when reviewing race- or gender-based measures.192 
In the material witness context, when a court is singularly 
deferential to the government’s position, it is at the expense of the 
court’s independence and its valuable judicial resources that are 
necessarily spent presiding over later proceedings when the court 
discovers it has been misled.193  However, the court’s independence 
could be better preserved if the court scrutinized the warrant to 
determine whether there is adequate support to uphold continuing 
detention or whether the government should be required to present 
new evidence indicating why further detention is necessary.194  Doing 
                                                 
 189. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 206–07 (contrasting the court’s review of 
Higazy’s warrant under the Bacon “mere statement” rule, where the court too readily 
found materiality based on the representation of the prosecutor, to the more 
probing Awadallah determination, which relied on factual statements). 
 190. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–95 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (illustrating that only a searching judicial inquiry will reveal the 
motivations behind a government action). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 493. 
 193. See, e.g., Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 358–60 (explaining that 
upon learning of the government’s misrepresentations, the court convened a 
hearing to examine the extent of the misrepresentations regarding the discovery of 
the transceiver and Higazy’s confession as to possessing it). 
 194. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2007) (establishing 
that the government’s newly proffered evidence—showing that Higazy confessed to 
owning the radio transceiver during the lie detector test—was sufficient to prolong 
his detention even though it had been Higazy who had requested the polygraph).  
The court previously entertained Higazy’s attorney’s request to grant the polygraph 
because Higazy was “urgently desirous of taking a lie detector test,” which suggested 
that Higazy did not own the radio transceiver and likely had been coerced into 
admitting that he did.  Id. at 165–66. 
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so could avoid situations like that of Higazy, where subsequent 
hearings exploring why and how the court had been misled lasted 
nearly five months.195  The court might have spared valuable judicial 
resources had it used a higher standard of review and required more 
conclusive proof for prolonging Higazy’s detention because it could 
have detected at an earlier point that, for example, Higazy had falsely 
confessed to owning the radio transceiver.196 
Moreover, if the court’s role is to examine the congressional intent 
behind a statute, then clear and convincing evidence can assist the 
court in preserving this role.197  Specifically, reviewing for clear and 
convincing evidence would compel the court to require 
particularized evidence of the materiality of a witness and the 
impracticability of securing a subpoena, which is mandated under the 
federal material witness statute.198 
Reviewing for clear and convincing evidence would allow courts to 
recognize, as Justice Ginsburg did in al-Kidd, that simply because a 
material witness warrant is “based on individualized suspicion,” it 
does not follow that the government’s reasons for holding a witness 
are insulated from scrutiny—particularly when the notion of 
individualized suspicion tends to imply that the person has engaged 
in wrongdoing.199  Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence implies that the 
government often detains a witness not when it wishes to call him for 
testimony but when the government intends to investigate the witness 
further for individual wrongdoing—an end goal that is anathema to 
                                                 
 195. Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 356, 359–60 (recounting the five-
month-long process of determining the root of the misrepresentations:  initial court 
hearing, December 18, 2001; subsequent hearing, December 28, 2001; telephonic 
conference, January 2002; oral argument, March 2002; and court order, August 
2002). 
 196. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (describing Higazy’s false 
confession and explaining what the court could have done differently to avoid the 
hearings inquiring into the government’s misrepresentations in Higazy’s case). 
 197. Senator Leahy’s proposed bill would amend the material witness statute to 
ensure that the material witness law is “used only for the narrow purpose that 
Congress originally intended, to obtain testimony, and not to hold criminal suspects 
without charge when probable cause is lacking.”  151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 198. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that courts might seriously inquire whether 
the government intends to call the material witness and whether there is sufficient 
information to hold the witness in order to avoid situations like al-Kidd’s).  Justice 
Ginsburg further opined that with a more thorough review of the spare affidavit, “al-
Kidd might have been spared the entire [detention] ordeal.”  Id. 
 199. See id. at 2088 n.3 (reasoning that “[m]aterial witness status does not 
‘involve[e] suspicion, or lack of suspicion,’ of the individual so identified” (quoting 
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004))). 
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the statute.200  Therefore, courts can safeguard their own 
independence and the interests of material witnesses by employing a 
clear and convincing standard of judicial review that critically re-
examines the government’s reasons for detaining a material witness 
and helps identify instances of pretextual detention.201 
C. Conducting Periodic Hearings Affords Material Witnesses the Requisite 
Procedural Safeguards and Allows Courts To Continue Reviewing the 
Government’s Reasons for Prolonged Detention Under Heightened Scrutiny 
Periodic status hearings comport with the procedural protections 
required by Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
can reduce the risk of erroneous prolonged detention by providing 
increased judicial oversight of the government’s reasons for 
continuing detention.202  Because material witnesses hold significant 
liberty interests, Congress intended to provide material witnesses with 
the right to mandatory bi-weekly judicial review when these witnesses 
are detained for an extended period of time.203  Periodic status 
hearings can additionally provide a material witness another avenue 
to challenge his detention and question whether he is being held for 
individual investigation.204  Thus, even if a court finds that the 
                                                 
 200. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(explaining that following 9/11, the government used the material witness statute for 
other ends—namely to detain people suspected of criminal activity for which 
probable cause had not been established). 
 201. See supra notes 190–91, 198 and accompanying text (illustrating that review of 
materiality and impracticability under heightened scrutiny should operate by 
providing specific examples where courts based the decision to grant a material 
witness warrant on factual information noting a particular risk of flight or inability to 
serve a subpoena). 
 202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2); see also Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 
F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that Rule 46 requires courts to 
continually monitor a material witness’s prolonged detention by holding bi-weekly 
status hearings to eliminate unnecessary detention wherever possible); In re Arnold, 
292 S.W.3d 393, 396–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (describing that a clear and convincing 
standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard sufficiently meets the 
constitutional requirements needed to protect sex offenders because it affords the 
court with continuing opportunities to review the offender’s civil commitment, thus 
ensuring a reduced risk of error). 
 203. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 advisory committee’s note (explaining that in 1966, 
Congress added subsection (h) to Rule 46 to supervise and eliminate all unnecessary 
detention of defendants and witnesses).  In 2002, Congress amended the language to 
remove the protection for defendants who were otherwise covered by the Speedy 
Trial Act, but kept the language in for material witnesses because they fall into a class 
that warrants additional protection.  Id. 
 204. See Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 410 (6th Cir. 2011) (providing that 
“material witnesses may petition for habeas corpus relief or move to quash their 
arrest warrants”).  Accordingly, both procedural devices can be used as forums for 
raising the issue of pretextual detention.  Id.; see also 109th Cong. § 1 (d)(2)(A), 
(d)(3)(A)–(C) (2005) (outlining the multiple instances where a material witness 
could periodically challenge detention under the proposed bill). 
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underlying material witness warrant is valid, a detainee can still argue 
at a status hearing or a habeas corpus proceeding that he is being 
held pretextually under Rule 46.205 
Periodic hearings206 not only provide an opportunity to challenge 
the government’s motive, but also give courts the ability to engage in 
a balancing test that weighs the interests of the state in having 
individuals testify against the interests of the witness in not being 
unreasonably detained, or being detained using only the least 
restrictive means.207  Moreover, courts can strike the proper balance 
between these competing interests at periodic hearings because they 
can delve into whether the government has actually attempted to 
secure testimony by deposition, as well as determine whether 
detention is the only means possible to secure the witness’s 
testimony.208  Additionally, periodic hearings allow the court to 
consider other factors that may be relevant to whether the witness is 
being held pretextually.  First, courts can consider how material the 
testimony really is, including whether the witness’s testimony is 
cumulative.  Second, courts can review the length of proposed 
detention—the longer the detention, the greater the showing 
required by the state to justify it.  Third, courts can assess the harm to 
the witness and the witness’s family, including lost wages and missed 
                                                 
 205. See, e.g., Adams, 656 F.3d at 410 (implying that material witnesses are not 
foreclosed from arguing improper motive at a Rule 46 or habeas corpus hearing).  A 
habeas corpus proceeding, in particular, allows the presiding court to release a 
material witness if the witness is able to show that his detainment met certain 
conditions.  Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box:  A Historical Perspective on the Detention 
of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 681, 692 & n.60 (2009). 
 206. From this point forward in this Comment, “periodic hearings” encompass 
both status hearings under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 and habeas 
corpus proceedings, while “status hearings” refers only to Rule 46 hearings 
throughout Part II.C. 
 207. In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 805 (Ct. App. 2001) (reasoning that 
because of the material witness’s unique position, he has the right to not be 
“unreasonably detained” and thus procedural safeguards must allow the interests of 
the witness to be heard with the interests of the state).  The court went on to indicate 
that determining whether and how long to detain a witness cannot be determined by 
applying “mechanical rules” given the important right at stake.  Id. at 805.  In 
conducting a balancing test, the court discussed taking a common sense approach 
that considers the interest of the witness as well as the interests of the prosecution 
and the defendant in the underlying criminal proceeding for which the witness’s 
testimony is needed.  Id. at 806. 
 208. See id. at 805 (noting that the government must show that it is necessary to 
hold the witness based on a good cause belief that the witness will not appear and 
testify, unless a more restrictive means is used to guarantee the witness’s future 
testimony).  The court should also consider any relevant change in circumstances 
when assessing whether less restrictive means are appropriate, including whether the 
witness has changed his attitude toward testifying or toward accepting other 
alternatives to custody, because such changes would suggest that means other than 
prolonged detention are appropriate.  Id. at 808. 
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classes.  Fourth, the court can consider the witness’s financial 
resources, particularly in setting bail.  Fifth, courts may evaluate other 
alternatives to incarceration.209 
1. The bi-weekly reporting requirement of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure allows a court to continue challenging the government’s 
reasons for prolonging the detention of an allegedly material witness 
Rule 46 affords material witnesses additional opportunities to 
screen for improper motive when the government prolongs 
witnesses’ detentions because Rule 46 requires the government to 
report bi-weekly to the court its reasons for holding any material 
witness rather than releasing or deposing him.210  Moreover, courts 
reviewing prolonged material witness detention are entitled to 
demand from the government the kind of showing that ensures a 
material witness is detained no longer than necessary.211  To ensure 
that material witnesses are held under the least restrictive means, a 
court can press the government for clear and convincing evidence 
demonstrating that it took specific measures to secure the witness’s 
testimony by deposition or that the witness continues to pose a flight 
risk.212  Consequently, to effectively scrutinize unnecessary delay on 
the government’s part, the court may incrementally increase the 
evidentiary standard that the government must meet:  The longer the 
witness is held, the greater the encroachment on the witness’s liberty 
interest.213 
When used properly, Rule 46 can provide an effective mechanism 
for challenging improper motive when the reviewing court authorizes 
continued detention based only on the government’s attempts to 
                                                 
 209. Id. at 806–07. 
 210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2); see also supra notes 202–05 and accompanying 
text (discussing the compulsory nature of the Rule 46 bi-weekly reporting 
requirement and its additional protections, which are not similarly afforded to other 
detained individuals); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (affording certain classes of 
prisoners the right to a writ of habeas corpus without additionally providing later 
opportunities for continuing reviewing of their detention). 
 211. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (outlining the protections for a 
material witness against unnecessary prolonged detainment found in the federal 
material witness statute and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46). 
 212. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 62–63; see also 151 CONG. REC.  20,943 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (asking courts reviewing a material witness’s 
detention to only authorize prolonged detention if the government shows that the 
witness poses a flight risk through clear and convincing evidence). 
 213. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (stating that the longer a witness 
is held in detention, the more substantial the justification needed from the 
government to warrant the extended delay). 
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compel testimony or prove flight risk.214  In Awadallah, the Second 
Circuit found that the witness’s detention was reasonable even 
though he was held for twenty days prior to giving testimony because 
Awadallah received adequate process to ensure he was not detained 
longer than necessary.215  However, the lower court could have found 
Awadallah’s detention unreasonable if it had used the clear and 
convincing standard to review the government’s reasons for 
prolonged detention, as that standard requires finding more than a 
reasonable probability that Awadallah would flee.216  By requiring a 
higher burden of proof that a detainee could be a flight risk, the 
court could have checked the sufficiency of the government’s 
arguments; likewise, in civil detention cases, courts use a higher 
burden of proof requiring more than just a few isolated instances of 
unusual conduct before involuntarily committing an individual.217  
Applying that standard to Awadallah’s case, the court could have 
required clear and convincing evidence of how his family ties would 
create a flight risk or pressed for evidence of a pattern of 
uncooperativeness to minimize any possible erroneous determination 
prolonging Awadallah’s detention.218 
Drawing further on the civil detention context, courts review 
individual commitments of sexual offenders based on clear and 
convincing evidence at annual show cause hearings following the 
                                                 
 214. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 62 (noting that Rule 46 allows the court to 
question whether Awadallah was properly detained when held for several weeks 
without being allowed to give his deposition or obtain release). 
 215. See id. at 63 (finding the conditions of Awadallah’s detention reasonable).  
The court determined Awadallah was not unreasonably detained based on the 
following:  (1) Awadallah appeared before a magistrate judge for a bail hearing the 
first business day after his arrest; (2) his attorney’s request to provide Awadallah’s 
testimony by deposition was denied only because Awadallah was impracticable to 
secure by subpoena; (3) Awadallah received a second bail hearing the following day 
after being transported to New York; (4) his request for release was denied again, but 
only after a finding that there was no way to prevent Awadallah from leaving New 
York before he would be summoned for grand jury testimony there; and (5) 
Awadallah was called for testimony the first business day the grand jury convened.  
Id. 
 216. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that lower courts should evaluate material 
witness warrants based on clear, concrete, and particularized findings of materiality 
and impracticability, which by definition would require proof beyond a reasonable 
probability). 
 217. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 63 (observing that the lower court’s 
determination that Awadallah was a flight risk was made without providing concrete 
reasons); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–27 (1979) (stating that the 
significant loss of liberty associated with involuntary commitment for a mentally ill 
person mandates a greater showing of illness than merely idiosyncratic behavior). 
 218. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (explaining that clear and convincing evidence 
reduces the chances that inappropriate and erroneous involuntary commitments will 
be ordered). 
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standards of proof the Supreme Court established for involuntary 
commitments in Addington.219  Because the interests of the committed 
individual remain the same upon review, the state accordingly 
continues to bear the burden of proof at the annual show cause 
hearing.220  Similarly, a material witness’s liberty interest remains the 
same throughout the witness’s detention.221  Consequently, material 
witnesses, like their civil detention counterparts, should be entitled to 
periodic review of their detention under the same clear and 
convincing standard.222 
Given that the reviewing district court has discretion to determine 
whether continued detention is justified, the range of outcomes 
resulting from material witness hearings is subject to what the 
reviewing court determines as sufficient evidence of flight risk.223  
Therefore, the protections afforded by any periodic hearing are only 
as strong as the level of scrutiny applied by the court.224  To ensure 
that material witnesses are afforded the greatest protection in 
challenging their prolonged detention and screening for pretext, 
                                                 
 219. See supra notes 124–25, 133 and accompanying text (discussing that courts 
apply the Foucha and Addington clear and convincing standard to the determination 
of whether to extend a sexual offender’s involuntary commitment at an annual show 
cause hearing). 
 220. See In re Det. of Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (implying that the 
due process liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence of insanity and 
dangerousness authorizing the initial involuntary commitment equally apply upon 
review of confinement). 
 221. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing the material witness’s 
significant liberty interest). 
 222. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(advocating for the clear and convincing standard used in the civil detention context 
to be established for material witness detention hearings). 
 223. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2003) (contemplating the 
sufficiency of the magistrate and district court’s findings regarding why Awadallah 
posed a flight risk, thus suggesting that evidence of flight risk can outweigh the 
continued detention’s intrusion on liberty).  The court found that the magistrate’s 
initial findings were justified because the magistrate analyzed Awadallah’s 
impracticability through a number of factors, including his family, employment, 
community ties, and financial resources.  Id. at 63 n.15.  Similarly, the court found 
the district court’s determination to deny Awadallah’s release to be reasonable and 
necessary when the judge relied on specific facts in the government’s application 
showing that Awadallah had possible incentive to leave; a determination of 
reasonableness suggests that no method other than detention could secure his 
presence before a grand jury.  Id. at 63. 
 224. See Cole, supra note 148, at 722 (implying that because there is no reason to 
justify delaying testimony of a material witness, a court should demand no less than 
good cause for such a delay).  Cole argues for the good cause standard in seeking a 
presumptive time limit on detention.  Id.  Applying the good cause requirement to an 
evidentiary standard could equate to clear and convincing following Senator Leahy’s 
approach in his bill to revamp the federal material witness statute.  See 151 CONG. REC. 
20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (suggesting that courts should review 
prolonged detention under a clear and convincing evidence standard). 
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witnesses should receive periodic review based on clear and 
convincing evidence.225 
2. Periodic hearings provide the court with the ability to consider alternative, 
less-restrictive methods of detention 
Courts can require the government to implement the least 
restrictive means for detention at periodic hearings taking into 
account both the important governmental interest and the interests 
of the witness.226  Specifically, at a status hearing, the government can 
appropriately raise concerns about a witness fleeing prior to 
providing testimony and the court can consider granting electronic 
monitoring of a witness as a less restrictive means.227  Moreover, 
habeas corpus proceedings allow the presiding court to release a 
material witness where the witness is able to show that he has been 
detained under certain conditions.228 
In facilitating the least restrictive detention possible, courts 
reviewing material witness detention can look to Croson for parallel 
guidance.  In Croson, the Court noted how the City of Richmond had 
at its disposal an array of race-neutral mechanisms it could use to 
increase minority accessibility to city contracting opportunities, and 
therefore its quota system was not the most narrowly-tailored means 
of achieving its goal.229  Similarly, in the material witness context, the 
government can use depositions, electronic monitoring, and speedy 
presentment of material witnesses for testimony, particularly at grand 
jury indictments that by nature are expedited proceedings, to ensure 
                                                 
 225. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text (describing the additional 
evidence that came to light during Higazy’s detention hearings, evidence that the 
court might have discovered earlier if it had initially required clear and convincing 
proof from the government). 
 226. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 806–07 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(suggesting that courts can consider granting less restrictive means of detaining a 
material witness such as electronic monitoring while simultaneously considering the 
government’s interests in securing witness testimony). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Ramsey, supra note 205, at 692 n.60.  Courts have released material witnesses 
by granting habeas corpus petitions in particular circumstances:  where a witness was 
held for ninety days without adequate explanation for the continuances; where the 
witness was held without a sufficient showing of flight risk or materiality proving that 
his testimony was needed for a specific criminal case, aside from a trumped-up “John 
Doe” case filed to facilitate his detention; and where the witness had been detained 
for five months in county jail and had not received a hearing nor been separated 
from those charged with or convicted of a crime.  Id. 
 229. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) 
(plurality opinion). 
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that witnesses are held for only as long as necessary and only under 
the least restrictive means possible.230 
D. Material Witnesses Are Best Protected When Courts Defer Less to the 
Government, When Their Attorneys Request Continuing Review of Prolonged 
Detention, and When the Government Requires Clear and Convincing 
Standards in Its Material Witness Detention Practice 
To stop the government’s practice of detaining material witnesses 
based on pretext, courts should refrain from overly deferring to 
government interests,231 which necessarily leads to the almost 
guaranteed granting of material witness warrants.232  Additionally, 
lawyers advocating for material witness clients should avail themselves 
of checks on prosecutorial and general governmental abuse by 
appealing continued detention as much as possible, questioning 
underlying material witness warrants at status hearings, using habeas 
corpus proceedings, and raising motions to quash underlying 
material witness warrants.233  Both periodic status hearings and habeas 
corpus proceedings would serve as critical safeguards for material 
witnesses because at either hearing the court would be required to 
release any material witness who is held without a showing that the 
detainee poses a flight risk or that the witness’s testimony is needed 
for a specific criminal case.234  For these reasons, courts should 
undertake additional hearings to continually review the status of 
material witnesses, and material witnesses should move for habeas 
corpus relief and periodic judicial review as much as possible.235 
                                                 
 230. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806–07 (discussing the host of 
alternative means available to the government to properly hold material witnesses 
and create the least amount of intrusion on the witness’s liberty interest). 
 231. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (illustrating that the Second Circuit judges 
“allowed great deference to the government’s claims that the material witnesses 
posed a threat to national security,” thus justifying their continued detention). 
 232. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (granting Higazy’s 
continued detention despite the government’s weak showing); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 
42, 66–69 (2d Cir. 2003) (authorizing Awadallah’s detention despite 
misrepresentations in the government’s material witness warrant application). 
 233. See Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 410 (6th Cir. 2011) (listing various checks 
to prosecutorial power through the judicial process available to people being 
detained as material witnesses). 
 234. See, e.g., In re Lewellyn, 62 N.W. 554, 554 (Mich. 1895) (per curiam) 
(releasing the material witness where the witness was held for an excessively long 
period and had never received a hearing or been properly segregated from the 
general prison population to account for his material witness status); In re 
Prestigiacomo, 255 N.Y.S. 289, 290–91 (App. Div. 1932) (ordering the material 
witness’s release where the court found no adequate evidence of flight risk). 
 235. See Adams, 656 F.3d at 410 (stating that petitioning for habeas corpus relief or 
moving to quash material arrest warrants are safeguards material witnesses may avail 
themselves of when challenging their detention). 
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Complementing the in-court advocacy, the government can 
evaluate and, where necessary, develop new and higher standards 
concerning what constitutes a sufficient and credible showing of a 
material witness warrant application, and subsequently, the 
government can provide follow-up training on the new standards for 
staff responsible for securing material witness warrants.236  If held to a 
higher standard, the government would be incentivized to make 
concrete findings rather than consistently have its material witness 
warrant applications denied by courts.  Moreover, implementing 
higher standards on the front end would also avoid the cost and use 
of resources required to make subsequent applications to courts 
denying material witness warrant applications based on scant 
evidentiary showings.  Lastly, Congress should consider replacing the 
material witness statute with a new statute, similar to the one 
proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy in 2005, that demands higher 
standards as to materiality and impracticability, preferably through 
clear and convincing evidence.237  Any amendment to the federal 
material witness statute should similarly require increased and more 
thorough judicial review of material witness warrants and the need 
for prolonged detention.238  These efforts would help preserve a 
material witness’s individual liberty and help increase the 
government’s accountability in the ever-expansive realm of material 
witness detention. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal material witness statute’s purpose is to allow the 
government to detain a material witness only where the witness is 
both material and impracticable.  Therefore, courts should review 
material witness warrant applications under a clear and convincing 
standard following civil detention cases because such a standard 
requires showing more than a reasonable probability that the witness 
is both material to a criminal proceeding and impracticable to secure 
                                                 
 236. FBI Releases Guiding Principles on Training, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION NEWS 
BLOG, http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/fbi-releases-guiding-principles-on-training 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (discussing the FBI’s newest guiding principles on training, 
mirroring the DOJ’s recently developed training guidance).  Counterterrorism 
training was among the types of training reviewed by the FBI, suggesting that both 
the DOJ and FBI could similarly institute training on how to properly follow 
heightened standards for material witness warrants.  Id. 
 237. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
recommending that courts require clear and convincing showings of materiality and 
impracticability and regularly engage in periodic judicial review of whether 
prolonged detention of any witness is necessary). 
 238. See id. 
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by any means other than arrest.  By using the clear and convincing 
standard, material witnesses would have a higher chance of avoiding 
pretextual detention because courts would be more likely to discover 
if the government is trying to hold a witness for individual 
investigation rather than for testimony in a future criminal 
proceeding.  Moreover, the clear and convincing standard used in 
civil detention cases is specifically designed to protect an important 
liberty interest.  Applying this reasoning to the material witness 
context, higher evidentiary showings would facilitate greater 
protection of the material witness’s interest in not being 
unreasonably detained. 
However, even where a material witness is arrested—a still 
somewhat probable result given the ex parte nature of the initial 
proceeding—a court can still reassess the validity of the material 
witness warrant under the same heightened standard of scrutiny.  
Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard when reviewing 
material witness warrants and prolonged detention would necessarily 
require the government to repeatedly prove continued materiality of 
the witness to an upcoming criminal proceeding and continued risk 
of flight, such that requires prolonged detention.  Furthermore, clear 
and convincing evidence would require reviewing courts to not overly 
defer to the interests of the government, and in turn allow courts to 
more readily identify instances where the government is pretextually 
holding a witness.  Consequently, using heightened judicial review 
would provide material witnesses the ability to directly challenge the 
government’s motive within the federal material witness statute’s 
framework.  Lastly, even if the court is satisfied with the government’s 
showings as to the warrant, courts can prescribe or the witness can 
petition for periodic hearings under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as well as through writs of habeas corpus, to 
further press the government into showing why the witness 
necessarily poses a flight risk and what diligent efforts it is taking to 
hold the witness under the least restrictive means possible. 
While using the clear and convincing standard in all stages of 
material witness proceedings might not serve as a full-proof bulwark 
against pretextual detention, it would go a long way to afford material 
witnesses the greatest protection possible.  Moreover, reading higher 
standards of proof and review into the federal material witness statute 
would help ensure that the statute is used only for its originally 
intended purpose. 
